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INTRODUCTION 
n July 1, 2019, Japan resumed commercial whaling after 
withdrawing from the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)1 and the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC).2 In announcing its withdrawal from the ICRW and 
IWC, Japan stated that it would allow commercial whaling within its 
1 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 
161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) [hereinafter ICRW]. The Schedule is an 
integral part of the ICRW. Id. art. I(1). The Schedule was last amended at the 67th Annual 
Meeting of the International Whaling Commission in September 2018. See id. (amended by 
the Commission at the 67th Meeting (Sept. 2018) [hereinafter Schedule]). 
2 The ICRW establishes the Commission in Article III. ICRW, supra note 1, art. III. The 
ICRW allows contracting governments to withdraw provided that they follow the procedural 
rules for doing so. The ICRW provides as follows: 
Any Contracting Government may withdraw from this Convention on June thirtieth 
of any year by giving notice on or before January first of the same year to the 
depositary Government, which upon receipt of such a notice shall at once 
communicate it to the other Contracting Governments. Any other Contracting 
Government may, in like manner, within one month of the receipt of a copy of such 
a notice from the depositary Government, give notice of withdrawal, so that the 
Convention shall cease to be in force on June thirtieth of the same year with respect 
to the Government giving such notice of withdrawal. 
Id. art. XI (dates amended to reflect United States conventions). Japan provided its notice 
within the required timeframe, with its withdrawal taking effect on June 30, 2019. Letter 
from Rebecca Lent, IWC Secretariat, Withdrawal of Japan from the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, WC.CCG.1348 (Jan. 14, 2019), https://archive. 
iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=7913&k= [https://perma.cc/P48M-M9Q9]. 
O 
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territorial seas and exclusive economic zones.3 As a consequence, 
Japan would no longer authorize whaling in high seas areas of the 
Southern Ocean or the North Pacific. Japan further declared that it 
would allow the catch of minke, sei, and Bryde’s whales.4 In fact, 
Japan’s fleet quickly caught 150 Bryde’s whales and allocated another 
thirty-seven Bryde’s whales to its self-allocated quota,5 as well as an 
additional minke whale.6 
Although Japan has withdrawn from the ICRW and IWC, it is still 
bound by customary international law and treaties, including the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),7 to which it is a party.8 
In particular, Japan must implement its duty to cooperate, an 
international obligation found in both customary international law and 
UNCLOS.9 Customary international law also includes a duty to 
conduct a transboundary environmental impact assessment (EIA)10 
3 Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretariat, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. JAPAN 
(Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.mofa.go.jp/ecm/fsh/page4e_000969.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4ZM7-W64B]. 
4 See Mari Yamaguchi, Japan to Resume Commercial Whaling, but Not in Antarctic, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 25, 2018, 6:45 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/japan-
says-it-will-leave-iwc-to-resume-commercial-whaling [https://perma.cc/RV7R-4BDD]; 
Japan to Restart Commercial Whale Hunts in 2019, VOICE AM. (Dec. 26, 2018), 
https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/japan-to-restart-commercial-whale-hunts-in-2019/ 
4717101.html [https://perma.cc/YYK3-UZPL]; Jiji Kyodo, Japan’s Commercial Whaling 
to Start in July for the First Time in 31 Years, JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/01/25/national/japans-commercial-whaling-start-
july-first-time-31-years/#.XO1vMnt7mJQ [https://perma.cc/6JEH-7K6K] (“A convoy of 
five whaling ships, including the No. 7 Katsu Maru, which belongs to the Taiji cooperative, 
will depart on July 1 from Kushiro Port in Hokkaido or Hachinohe Port in Aomori Prefecture 
. . . .”). 
5 Regarding Allocation of Supplementary Quotas, Japan Fisheries Agency, http://www. 
jfa.maff.go.jp/e/index.html [https://perma.cc/27PD-FUZW] (unofficial translation on file 
with author) (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
6 Id. 
7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S 3, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
8 Japan became a party to UNCLOS on June 20, 1996. Chronological Lists of 
Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements, 
U.N. OCEANS & L. SEA, https://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_ 
of_ratifications.htm [https://perma.cc/44HH-EGSY] (last updated Mar. 9, 2020). 
9 See infra Section II.A. 
10 A transboundary environmental impact assessment (EIA) is a comprehensive report 
analyzing the environmental impacts of a proposed project prior to conducting any activity 
that may adversely affect the environment, including proposed actions to mitigate those 
impacts. See U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., BENEFITS AND COSTS OF TRANSBOUNDARY 
EIA 1 (2007), https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/pamphlets/ 
Pamphlet%20-%20Benefits%20of%20transboundary%20EIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/U23H-
SJ6Z]. 
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prior to conducting any activity that may adversely affect the territory 
of another state or areas beyond national jurisdiction.11 Thus, although 
Japan has resumed commercial whaling after withdrawing from the 
ICRW, it is still bound by the duty to cooperate and, because it allows 
hunting of whales shared with other states, it is required to prepare a 
transboundary EIA.12 
To fulfill its duty to cooperate, Japan must engage meaningfully with 
the IWC in several important ways. The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), and 
other international tribunals have all declared that the duty to cooperate, 
whether as customary international law or as a fundamental principle 
of UNCLOS, requires states to give “due regard” to the rights of other 
states.13 As described in Part II, the ICJ and international tribunals have 
found that the duty to cooperate requires information exchange, 
consultation, notification, and preparation of an EIA. These elements 
do not necessarily represent the full extent of a state’s duty to 
cooperate. The specific elements of the duty to cooperate depend on 
the nature of the rights held by other states. 
Moreover, Japan must cooperate through the IWC because 
UNCLOS requires parties to cooperate through the “appropriate 
international organizations” and, as Part III concludes, the IWC is the 
appropriate international organization for the conservation and 
management of whales. The IWC is the “appropriate international 
organization” regardless of whether Japan whales in its exclusive 
economic zone or the high seas and regardless of the presence of any 
other organization because the IWC has a global mandate to conserve, 
manage, and study whales. Japan has actively embraced that mandate, 
including with respect to the stocks that Japan now hunts for 
commercial purposes. 
Part IV describes how Japan must work through the IWC in order to 
fulfill its duty to cooperate and give “due regard” to the rights of IWC 
members. For example, it must participate meaningfully in meetings of 
the IWC and the IWC Scientific Committee, submit data on whales 
struck and lost as well as whales caught as bycatch, and implement the 
Revised Management Procedure (RMP) because the RMP represents 
the scientifically vetted method for calculating sustainable catch 
11 See infra Section II.B. 
12 See infra Section III.A. 
13 See infra Part II. 
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limits.14 Moreover, to ensure its whaling is sustainable, Japan should 
have prohibited whaling, at least until significant data gaps are filled in 
relation to the stocks that Japan hunts. 
Part V explains that IWC members that are also UNCLOS parties 
may vindicate their rights using the binding and compulsory dispute 
settlement provisions of UNCLOS. This Article concludes with a list 
of the specific actions that Japan must undertake to fulfill its duty to 
cooperate with the IWC and to prepare a transboundary EIA. In 
addition, it concludes that Japan has violated its duty to cooperate by 
resuming commercial whaling without seeking the advice of the IWC’s 
Scientific Committee, without a scientifically accepted understanding 
of the stock structure for sei whales, and without using the IWC’s 
scientifically vetted algorithm for setting catch limits.15 Japan has also 
violated its duty to cooperate by resuming commercial whaling without 
preparing a transboundary EIA.16 
I 
THE ICRW AND COMMERCIAL WHALING MORATORIUM 
Since 1948, when the ICRW entered into force,17 IWC members 
have pursued the ICRW’s twin goals of conservation of whales and the 
orderly development of a whaling industry.18 The ICRW itself 
establishes few rules to achieve those goals. Instead, it creates a 
commission, the IWC,19 with the authority to adopt binding regulations 
“with respect to the conservation and utilization of whale resources.”20
These regulations may relate to a wide variety of matters, including 
protected and unprotected species; open and closed seasons; open and 
closed waters; size limits; and time, methods, and intensity of 
whaling.21 These regulations, which must be adopted by a three-fourths 
14 See infra Section IV.D. 
15 See infra Section IV.D. 
16 See infra Section IV.E. 
17 ICRW, supra note 1. 
18 Id. pmbl. A large number of articles describes the history of the ICRW, the IWC, and 
the regulation of whaling. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their 
Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT’L. L. 21 (1991); Gare Smith, The International 
Whaling Commission: An Analysis of the Past and Reflections on the Future, 16 NAT. 
RESOURCES LAW. 543 (1984). 
19 ICRW, supra note 1, art. III(1). 
20 Id. art. V(1). 
21 Id. 
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majority of IWC members,22 are included in the ICRW’s Schedule.23 
Over time, the IWC has established an array of binding regulations. 
These include, for example, the creation of the Southern Ocean 
Sanctuary,24 catch limits,25 size limits,26 restrictions on the types of 
harpoons that can be used,27 and rules for aboriginal subsistence 
whaling.28 Paragraph 10 of the Schedule classifies whale stocks into 
three categories and sets quotas based on the maximum sustained yield 
(MSY) target for that category.29 
Despite these binding regulations, the IWC did little to arrest the 
continuing decline of many whale populations; by the early 1970s, 
“stocks of Antarctic whales were so badly depleted that, assuming a 
total and effective ban on whaling, it would take fifteen years [for] fin 
whales to recover to the optimum and fifty years for blue whales.”30 In 
the early 1970s, the United States listed eight great whale species as 
“endangered” under the U.S. Endangered Species Act.31 At the 
international level, the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human 
Environment unanimously recommended a ten-year moratorium on 
commercial whaling.32 
22 Id. art. III(2). 
23 Schedule, supra note 1. 
24 Id. ¶ 7(b) (designating coordinates for the perimeter of the “Southern Ocean 
Sanctuary”). 
25 Id. ¶ 10(e) (setting the catch limits for commercial purposes to zero). 
26 Id. ¶¶ 15, 18 (establishing size limits that protect smaller, younger whales for several 
species). 
27 Id. ¶ 6 (forbidding use of the “cold grenade harpoon” for many commercial whaling 
purposes). 
28 Id. ¶ 13 (creating standards for ASW whaling based on aboriginal needs and 
maximum sustainable yields). 
29 Id. ¶¶ 10(a)–(c) (outlining the following categories: Sustained Management Stock, 
Initial Management Stock, and Protection Stock). 
30 D’Amato & Chopra, supra note 18, at 12. 
31 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531–1544 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91); see also 50 C.F.R. 
§§ 17.11, 17.12 (2019) (providing the lists of endangered and threatened species). The lists
show that the blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus), fin whale (B. physalus), bowhead whale
(Balaena mysticus), gray whale (Eschrichtius robustus), humpback whale (Megaptera
novaengliae), North Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena glacialis), North Pacific right whale
(E. japonica), sei whale (B. borealis), southern right whale (E. australis), and sperm whale
(Physter catodon) were listed as endangered in 1970. The National Marine Fisheries Service
originally listed the right whale as a single species. In 2008, the National Marine Fisheries
Service split the right whale into three distinct species. Endangered and Threatened Species;
Endangered Status for North Pacific and North Atlantic Right Whales, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,024
(Mar. 6, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 224).
32 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, 3, 12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973), 
https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 [https://perma.cc/SBK7-29DW]. 
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Finally recognizing the dire situation for many whale populations, 
the IWC adopted a moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982 to 
begin with the 1985–1986 pelagic whaling season and the 1986 coastal 
whaling season.33 Since then, catch limits for all stocks for commercial 
purposes have been set to zero.34 
Despite the moratorium, commercial whaling never ended because 
several IWC members opted out of the moratorium through 
objections35 or reservations.36 Japan, Norway, Peru, and the USSR, for 
example, lodged timely objections to the commercial whaling 
moratorium; thus, the moratorium did not apply to them.37 While 
Norway continues to engage in commercial whaling pursuant to its 
objection—killing at least 432 minke whales in 201738—Peru, the 
USSR, and Japan withdrew their objections.39 In addition, Iceland, 
having failed to lodge an objection to the moratorium despite voting 
against the moratorium,40 eventually ceased whaling, withdrew from 
the ICRW in 1992,41 but rejoined in 2002 with a reservation.42 The 
33 THIRTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, INT’L 
WHALING COMMISSION 1, 6 (1983) [hereinafter THIRTY-THIRD REPORT]. 
34 Schedule, supra note 1, ¶ 10(e). Whaling is still permitted for “aboriginal subsistence 
use,” provided that the provisions of the Schedule are met. Id. ¶ 13. 
35 Under the ICRW, an amendment “shall not become effective with respect to any 
Government which has so objected until such date as the objection is withdrawn.” ICRW, 
supra note 1, art. V(3). 
36 A reservation is “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, 
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application 
to that State.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(d), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
37 THIRTY-THIRD REPORT, supra note 33, para. 2; see also Schedule, supra note 1, 
¶ 10(e) n.* (providing that “[t]he Governments of Japan, Norway, Peru and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics lodged objection[s] to paragraph 10(e) [of the Schedule] within 
the prescribed period.”); see ICRW, supra note 1, art. V(3) (describing the procedures for 
lodging an objection). 
38 Catches Taken: Under Objection or Under Reservation, INT’L WHALING 
COMMISSION, https://iwc.int/table_objection [https://perma.cc/C3A9-SBQG] (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2020). 
39 Schedule, supra note 1, ¶ 10(e) n.*. 
40 Philip Shabecoff, Commission Votes to Ban Hunting of Whales, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 
1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/24/us/commission-votes-to-ban-hunting-of-
whales.html [https://perma.cc/KFV4-NVCX] (noting that the seven IWC members in 
opposition were Brazil, Iceland, South Korea, Japan, Norway, Peru, and the Soviet Union). 
41 Iceland and Commercial Whaling, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, http://iwc.int/ 
iceland [https://perma.cc/5H6F-G7Q7] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
42 Schedule, supra note 1, ¶ 10(e) n.* (referring to Iceland’s instrument of adherence 
deposited on October 10, 2002, that states Iceland “adheres to the aforesaid Convention and 
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ICRW does not explicitly allow reservations when ratifying or 
acceding to the convention, but it does not preclude them.43 As a result, 
many IWC members consider Iceland’s reservation invalid,44 but 
Iceland nevertheless resumed commercial whaling in 2006.45  
Meanwhile, Japan continued to hunt whales pursuant to the ICRW’s 
provision that allows an IWC member to issue “special permits” 
authorizing the killing of whales “for purposes of scientific research.”46 
Beginning in 1987, immediately after the moratorium took effect, each 
year Japan took hundreds of minke whales from the Southern Ocean 
and hundreds more minke, Bryde’s, and sei whales from the North 
Pacific Ocean.47 The legal support for Japan’s whaling, however, began 
to unravel in 2014 when the ICJ ruled that Japan’s whaling in the 
Southern Ocean was not for “purposes of scientific research.”48 The ICJ 
agreed that Japan’s whaling was illegal commercial whaling.49 Japan 
claimed to take the ICJ’s decision into account when it revised its 
whaling program for both the Southern Ocean and the North Pacific, 
but the IWC’s Scientific Committee, two expert panels established by 
Protocol with a reservation with respect to paragraph 10(e) of the Schedule attached to the 
Convention”). 
43 Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 19 (“The Vienna Convention provides: 
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, 
formulate a reservation unless: 
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the
reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not failing under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”).
44 Iceland’s reservation has been particularly controversial, with several IWC members 
lodging objections to it. Schedule, supra note 1, ¶ 10(e) n.* (reporting objections to Iceland’s 
reservation by Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, 
Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States). One reason that Iceland’s reservation is so controversial 
is that Iceland cast the decisive vote to approve it, a decision that many regard as 
fundamentally flawed. See Chris Wold, Implementation of Reservations Law in 
International Environmental Treaties: The Cases of Cuba and Iceland, 14 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 53, 91 (2003). 
45 Catches Taken: Under Objection or Under Reservation, supra note 38. 
46 See ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIII. 
47 Catches Taken: Special Permit, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, https://iwc.int/permits 
[https://perma.cc/K6XR-VEX4] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
48 Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. Intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226 (Mar. 31), ¶ 247(2), https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/148/judgments [https://perma. 
cc/TWB5-F8SA]. 
49 Id. ¶ 247(3). 
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the IWC, and the IWC itself determined that Japan provided 
insufficient information in its whaling plans to assess them.50 
Moreover, the Standing Committee of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES)51 concluded that Japan’s movement of sei whale meat from 
the high seas into Japan violated CITES rules prohibiting trade in 
specimens of Appendix I species like the sei whale52 for primarily 
commercial purposes.53 While Japan argued that its trade was not for 
primarily commercial purposes because its whaling was for scientific 
research,54 that position was difficult to maintain since Japan did not 
test any of the whale meat—some 12 metric tons55 for each of the 90 to 
100 sei whales that Japan introduced each year56—that entered the 
Japanese market.57 According to the CITES Secretariat, “It is . . . hard 
50 REPORT OF THE STANDING WORKING GROUP ON SPECIAL PERMIT PROGRAMMES, 
INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, IWC/67/16/Rev 3 (2018) (noting that the “the Expert Panel’s 
capacity to conduct a full review was limited by the fact that the proponent did not submit a 
final, fully justified proposal.”); CHAIR’S REPORT OF THE 67TH MEETING, INT’L WHALING 
COMMISSION, § 14 (2018). 
51 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975) 
[hereinafter CITES]. 
52 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
app. I, II and III (entered into force Oct. 4, 2017) (placing Balaenoptera borealis in 
Appendix I), https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/app/2017/E-Appendices-2017-10-04. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/X4VW-T45M]. 
53 Appendix I species includes those “species threatened with extinction which are or may 
be affected by trade.” CITES, supra note 51, art. II(1). The movement of specimens of 
CITES-listed Appendix I species from the high seas into a State is called “introduction from 
the sea” under CITES. Id. art. I(e). CITES prohibits introduction from the sea of Appendix 
I specimens for “primarily commercial purposes.” Id. art. III(5)(c). The CITES Standing 
Committee, which addresses compliance issues, concluded that Japan’s trade in sei whale 
meat violated Article III(5)(c) of the convention and that Japan should “take immediate 
remedial action to comply.” Summary Record, Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, SC70 SR, 26 (Oct. 5, 2018), https://cites.org/ 
sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/70/exsum/E-SC70-SR.pdf [https://perma.cc/BAT6-XJHT]. 
54 Introduction from the Sea of Sei Whales (Balaenoptera borealis) by Japan, 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, SC70 Doc. 
27.3.4, ¶ 52 (Oct. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Sei Whales]. 
55 JUNKO SAKUMA, REPORT ON SEI WHALE PRICES 5 (2017) (on file with author). 
56 Sei Whales, supra note 54, ¶ 57. 
57 Id. ¶ 43 (“[T]he Secretariat considers that inquiry is warranted with respect to meat 
and blubber of sei whales which are not utilized in the scientific research.”). See also 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROJECT, LEGALITY OF JAPAN’S ISSUANCE OF 
INTRODUCTION FROM THE SEA (IFS) CERTIFICATES FOR SEI WHALE MEAT PRODUCTS 
(2017), https://awionline.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/temp/FINAL-Sei-
whale-IFS-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y6E-XFMX] (providing an independent analysis of 
the legality of Japan’s whale meat trade). 
96 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 35, 87 
to conceive” that Japan’s trade in sei whale meat “pursues a 
predominantly scientific purpose, unless the Committee agrees that 
selling the specimens to finance scientific research constitutes a 
scientific purpose.”58 The Secretariat further noted that to conclude that 
Japan’s trade was not for primarily commercial purposes would require 
the Standing Committee “to disregard a number of legal provisions.”59 
Shortly after this second international defeat, Japan announced that 
it would resume commercial whaling.60 To avoid subsequent disputes 
concerning the IWC’s moratorium, it would withdraw from the ICRW 
and IWC.61 In order to comply with CITES, Japan would whale within 
its jurisdictional waters to avoid international trade in whale meat.62
Earlier, after the ICJ’s ruling in Whaling in the Antarctic, Japan 
withdrew from the jurisdiction of the ICJ.63 
II 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
JAPANESE WHALING 
Despite these legal maneuverings, Japan cannot engage in whaling 
free of legal constraints because Japan is still bound by customary 
international law64 and other treaties to which it is a party,65 including 
UNCLOS. Two principles most relevant to Japanese whaling are the 
58 Sei Whales, supra note 54, ¶ 62. 
59 Id. ¶ 64. 
60 Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretariat, supra note 3. 
61 Letter from Rebecca Lent, supra note 2. 
62 Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretariat, supra note 3. 
63 Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory (Japan), INT’L 
CT. JUST. (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations/jp [https://perma.cc/SJ6C-
USM6] [hereinafter Declarations of Japan] (amending its declaration to preclude the 
International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction in “any dispute arising out of, concerning, or 
relating to research on, or conservation, management or exploitation of, living resources of 
the sea.”). 
64 Numerous decisions of the International Court of Justice have concluded that 
customary international law binds States even in the absence of their consent. See, e.g., 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18); Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); 
see also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
65 A basic notion of international law is that States are bound only by those treaties to 
which they agree to be bound. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment 
of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28) https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/12/012-19510528-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7JJ-
JRHS] (“It is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its 
consent.”); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”). 
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duty to cooperate and, because the whales Japan is hunting are shared 
with other States,66 the duty to prepare a transboundary EIA. 
A. UNCLOS and Its Duty to Cooperate to Protect Living Resources
UNCLOS establishes a comprehensive body of law to govern
activities in the marine environment. It establishes rules relating to 
the conservation and use of living and nonliving marine resources,67 
pollution,68 enforcement,69 the establishment of jurisdictional 
boundaries,70 navigation,71 and compulsory dispute settlement,72 
among many other things. 
Within its exclusive economic zone, an area up to 200 nautical miles 
from the state’s coastline,73 a coastal state has sovereign rights to 
exploit, conserve, and manage living resources, including fish.74 The 
coastal state may set total allowable catches,75 but must do so subject 
to “proper conservation and management measures” that are based on 
the best scientific information available76 and are designed to produce 
MSY,77 as well as ensure species are not overexploited,78 and promote 
optimum utilization.79 UNCLOS defines neither MSY nor optimum 
utilization but provides that MSY can be “qualified by relevant 
environmental and economic factors.”80 
The duty to cooperate is fundamental to UNCLOS. Even when 
acting within its sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone, a 
coastal state must “exercis[e] its rights and perform[] its duties” while 
66 See infra Section III.A. 
67 UNCLOS, supra note 7, arts. 55–120. 
68 Id. arts. 192–212. 
69 Id. arts. 73, 213–22. 
70 Id. arts. 2–16, 55–57, 76–78. 
71 Id. arts. 34–44, 90. 
72 Id. at Annexes V–VIII. 
73 Id. art. 57. 
74 Id. art. 56. 
75 Id. art. 61(1). 
76 Id. art. 61(2). 
77 Id. art. 61(3). 
78 Id. art. 61(2). 
79 Id. art. 62(1). 
80 The provision allows MSY to be qualified by “relevant environmental and economic 
factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special 
requirements of developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the 
interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum 
standards, whether subregional, regional or global.” Id. art. 61(3). 
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giving “due regard to the rights and duties of other States.”81 Moreover, 
coastal and other states must cooperate for the conservation and 
management of straddling stocks—those species that move between 
the exclusive economic zones of two or more states or between an 
exclusive economic zone and the high seas.82 Similarly, they must 
cooperate “directly or through appropriate international organizations 
with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of 
optimum utilization” of highly migratory species listed in Annex I of 
UNCLOS.83 Annex I includes many whale and dolphin species, 
including those that Japan is hunting as part of its resumed commercial 
whaling operation.84 They must also cooperate to conserve and manage 
anadromous85 and catadromous species,86 as well as to protect the 
marine environment.87 
In addition, Articles 65 and 120 of UNCLOS specifically impose the 
duty to cooperate with respect to the conservation, management, and 
study of cetaceans (whales, dolphins, and porpoises).88 Article 65 
recognizes that coastal states individually or acting through 
international organizations may “prohibit, limit or regulate the 
exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided” by MSY 
81 Id. art. 56(2). 
82 Id. art. 63. 
83 Id. art. 64(1). 
84 Id. at Annex I (This list includes all cetaceans in the following families: Family 
Physeteridae; Family Balaenopteridae; Family Balaenidae; Family Eschrichtiidae; Family 
Monodontidae; Family Ziphiidae; and Family Delphinidae.). 
85 Id. art. 66. Anadromous species are those, like salmon, that spawn in freshwater and 
spend the majority of their lives in the marine environment. What Is an Anadromous Fish? 
A Catadromous Fish?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.nefsc.noaa. 
gov/faq/faq-archive/fishfaq1a.html#q6 [https://perma.cc/ML72-NGVR] (last visited Mar. 
13, 2020). 
86 UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 67. Catadromous species are those, like many eels, that 
live their adult lives in freshwater but spawn in the marine environment. What Is an 
Anadromous Fish? A Catadromous Fish?, supra note 85. 
87 UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 197 (“States shall co-operate on a global basis and, as 
appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, 
in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and 
procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.”). 
88 Id. arts. 65, 120 (providing that states shall “work through the appropriate international 
organizations for [the] conservation management and study” of cetaceans); see also 
Ted L. McDorman, Canada and Whaling: An Analysis of Article 65 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention, 29 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 179, 184 (1998) (calling the phrase “work through” 
in article 65 a “refinement” of the duty to cooperate that “provide[s] a degree of explicitness 
or guidance for the duty to cooperate”). 
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or optimum utilization.89 With regard to the duty to cooperate, Article 
65 requires states to “co-operate with a view to the conservation of 
marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work 
through the appropriate international organizations for their 
conservation, management and study.”90 While Article 65 applies to 
marine mammals within exclusive economic zones, Article 120 
extends the duty of cooperation to marine mammals in the high seas.91 
B. The Duty to Cooperate as a Bedrock International Law Principle
Given the complexity of managing the array of activities that occur
in the marine environment, UNCLOS’s embrace of the duty to 
cooperate is not surprising. In fact, the duty to cooperate is the “bedrock 
of international law.”92 As the U.N. Declaration of Principles on 
International Law declares 
States have the duty to co-operate with one another, irrespective of 
the differences in their political, economic and social systems, in the 
various spheres of international relations, in order to maintain 
international peace and security and to promote international 
economic stability and progress, the general welfare of nations and 
international co-operation free from discrimination based on such 
differences.93 
Due to its importance in avoiding and resolving international problems, 
the duty to cooperate finds expression in all spheres of international 
law,94 as well as “virtually all” international environmental 
agreements.95 Consequently, the ICJ, ITLOS, and other international 
89 UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 65 (“Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal 
State or the competence of an international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or 
regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part.”). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. art. 120 (“Article 65 also applies to the conservation and management of marine 
mammals in the high seas.”). 
92 Patricia Wouters, ‘Dynamic Cooperation’ in International Law and the Shadow of 
State Sovereignty in the Context of Transboundary Waters, 3 ENVTL. LIABILITY 88, 88 
(2013). 
93 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, (Oct. 24, 1970). 
94 See, e.g., id. (stating that “States have the duty to cooperate with one another . . . to 
promote international economic stability and progress”). 
95 PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 215 
(4th ed. 2018); see also, e.g., Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988); Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 10, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1541; 30 I.L.M. 537 (entered into force Jan. 
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tribunals have recognized the duty to cooperate as customary 
international law.96 
1. Purpose and Nature of the Duty to Cooperate
The ICJ and international tribunals have consistently concluded that
the essential purpose of the duty to cooperate is to protect the rights of 
states that might be affected by another state’s activities. Given the 
importance of protecting the rights of other states, the ICJ and 
international tribunals have interpreted the duty to cooperate as 
including a number of specific components, including the duty to 
negotiate, consult, share information, monitor impacts of activities, and 
conduct environmental impact assessments.97 
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, for example, which involved 
disputes over fisheries access, the ICJ concluded that the disputing 
states “ha[d] an obligation to take full account of each other’s rights 
and of any fishery conservation measures the necessity of which is 
shown to exist in those waters.”98 While this dispute arose prior to the 
adoption of UNCLOS, it did occur during negotiations of a new Law 
of the Sea regime.99 In that context, the ICJ noted that “the former 
1, 1989), https://www.ozone.unep.org/treaties/montreal-protocol [https://perma.cc/3C37-
YK6M]; Stockholm Declaration of the United Conference on the Human Environment, June 
16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416, Principle 24 (1972), http://www.un-documents.net/unchedec.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LQV7-6DFC] [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]; Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/26 (vol. I), June 14, 1992, 
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992), https://cil.nus.edu.sg/databasecil/1992-rio-declaration-
on-environment-and-development [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; CITES, supra note 51, 
pmbl. (“Recognizing . . . that international co-operation is essential for the protection of 
certain species of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through international trade 
. . . .”); The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) provides that the conservation of 
biological diversity is a common concern. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 
1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (1992) (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993), available at https://www. 
cbd.int/convention/text/ [https://perma.cc/L9DB-N67P]. 
96 See, e.g., Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain) 12 R.I.A.A. 281, 296 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1957); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, at 20 (Sept. 25) (“Only 
by international co-operation could action be taken to alleviate these problems.”); SANDS ET 
AL., supra note 95. 
97 As one international scholar succinctly states, the duty to cooperate “has . . . been 
translated into more specific commitments,” including environmental impact assessment, 
information exchange, consultation, and notification. SANDS ET AL., supra note 95, at 215–
16. 
98 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Merits, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 72 (July 25); see also 
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), Merits, 1974 I.C.J. Reports 175, ¶ 64 (July 25). 
99 The Fisheries Jurisdiction cases took place during the early 1970s, with the I.C.J.’s 
opinion published in 1974. Meanwhile, the UNCLOS negotiations began in 1973 and ended 
in 1982. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – A Historical Perspective 
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laissez-faire treatment of the living resources of the sea in the high seas 
has been replaced by a recognition of a duty to have due regard to the 
rights of other States and the needs of conservation for the benefit of 
all.”100 Consequently, the disputing states were required to share 
information and take into account relevant international agreements.101 
Moreover, the ICJ explained that states undertaking an activity have 
a duty to negotiate and consult in good faith.102 The duty to consult and 
negotiate “flows from the very nature of the respective rights of the 
Parties” and “negotiations are required in order to define or delimit the 
extent of those rights . . . .”103 The ICJ concluded that the duty to 
consult and negotiate “corresponds to the Principles and provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations concerning peaceful settlement of 
disputes.”104 
Tribunals have reached similar conclusions when interpreting 
UNCLOS. In the Chagos arbitration,105 the tribunal reviewed a number 
of UNCLOS provisions relating to sovereignty and sovereign rights—
Article 2(3) on the territorial sea, Article 34(2) on international straits, 
Article 56(2) on the exclusive economic zone, Article 78(2) on the 
continental shelf, and Article 87(2) on the high seas.106 The tribunal 
noted that all of these provisions require states to exercise their rights 
under the Convention “subject to, or with regard to, the rights and 
duties of other States or rules of international law beyond the 
Convention itself.”107 It further stated that giving “due regard” to the 
(1998), U.N. OCEANS & L. SEA, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
convention_historical_perspective.htm [https://perma.cc/7VYY-9E5P] (last visited Mar. 
13, 2020). 
100 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Merits, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 72 (July 25); accord 
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), Merits, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 175, ¶ 64 (July 25). 
101 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3; accord Fisheries Jurisdiction 
(Ger. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 175. 
102 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 73–75; accord Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 175, ¶ 65. 
103 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 74, 75; accord Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 175, ¶¶ 66, 67. 
104 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 75; accord Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 175, ¶ 67; accord North Sea Continental Shelf 
(Ger. v. Den. / Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 86 (Feb. 20) (stating that the obligation 
to consult and negotiate “constitutes a special application of a principle which underlies all 
international relations, and which is moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter of the 
United Nations as one of the methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes”). 
105 Chagos Arbitration, Mauritius v. U.K., 2011-03 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), https://pca-
cpa.org/en/cases/11/ [https://perma.cc/MP22-VRMS]. 
106 Id. ¶ 503. 
107 Id. 
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rights of other states should be interpreted based on “the circumstances 
and by the nature of those rights.”108 The tribunal declined to find in 
this formulation “any universal rule of conduct” but stated that such a 
rule would “depend upon the nature of the rights held by [the affected 
states], their importance, the extent of anticipated impairment, the 
nature and importance of the activities contemplated by the [project 
proponent], and the availability of alternative approaches.”109 These 
conditions would involve, “[i]n the majority of cases,” “at least some 
consultation with the rights-holding State.”110 
Similarly, in the MOX Plant case, ITLOS was asked to resolve a 
dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom concerning potential 
discharges of radioactive material into the Irish Sea from the operation 
of a MOX (mixed oxides) plant at Sellafield.111 Although ITLOS did 
not find the discharges serious enough to require changes to the 
operation of the plant, it did conclude that the duty to cooperate was 
implicated: “The duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the 
prevention of pollution of the marine environment under Part XII of the 
Convention and general international law and that rights arise 
therefrom which the Tribunal may consider appropriate to preserve 
under article 290 of the [UNCLOS].”112 
As a result, it directed the two disputing parties to cooperate by 
entering into consultations to exchange information with regard to 
possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising out of the 
commissioning of the MOX plant, monitor risks or the effects of the 
operation of the MOX plant for the Irish Sea, and devise, as 
108 Id. ¶ 519. 
109 Id. 
110 Id.; see also id. ¶¶ 521–522 (noting the importance of consultation). 
111 MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2001 ITLOS Rep. 95 
(Dec. 3). 
112 Id. ¶ 82. In his separate opinion, Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum states that 
the obligation to cooperate is the overriding principle of international environmental 
law, in particular when the interests of neighbouring States are at stake. The duty to 
cooperate denotes an important shift in the general orientation of the international 
legal order. It balances the principle of sovereignty of States and thus ensures that 
community interests are taken into account vis-à-vis individualistic State interests. It 
is a matter of prudence and caution as well as in keeping with the overriding nature 
of the obligation to co-operate that the parties should engage therein as prescribed in 
paragraph 89 of the Order. 
MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Separate Opinion (Wolfrum, J.), 2001 ITLOS Rep. 111, 135–36 
(Dec. 3), https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/published/ 
C10-O-3_dec_01-SO_W.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DEE-TFAA]. 
2020] Japan's Whaling and Duty to Cooperate with the IWC 103 
appropriate, measures to prevent pollution of the marine environment 
that might result from the operation of the MOX plant.113 
In the Land Reclamation case, Malaysia challenged a land 
reclamation project in Singapore’s territorial waters as causing 
environmental impacts to waters in Malaysia.114 The tribunal 
concluded that insufficient cooperation had taken place and ordered the 
disputing parties, as a means to effectuate their duty to cooperate, to 
conduct an environmental assessment of the project and exchange 
information on the risks and effects of the project.115 It also ordered 
them to “consult with a view to reaching a prompt agreement on such 
temporary measures” concerning land reclamation at one specific 
site.116 In reflecting on the balance between sovereignty and the rights 
of other states, two of the judges observed that “[t]he right of a State to 
use marine areas and natural resources subject to its sovereignty or 
jurisdiction is broad but not unlimited. It is qualified by the duty to have 
due regard to the rights of other States and to the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment.”117 To protect the rights of 
both Malaysia and Singapore in this dispute, the duty to cooperate 
required “a common base of information and evaluation regarding the 
effects of the land reclamation project that can command the 
confidence of both parties” and consultation with a view to reaching a 
prompt agreement on such temporary measures.118 
2. The Duty to Cooperate When Sovereign Rights Are Exercised
Significantly, the duty to cooperate exists regardless of whether a
state’s activities engage that state’s sovereignty or sovereign rights. As 
the tribunal in the Lac Lanoux arbitration119 concluded, territorial 
sovereignty “must bend before all international obligations, whatever 
their origin, but only before such obligations.”120 In this case, involving 
the use of water resources shared by France and Spain, the tribunal 
113 MOX Plant, 2001 ITLOS Rep. 95, ¶ 89. 
114 Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), 
Provisional Measures, 2003 ITLOS Rep. 10 (Oct. 8). 
115 Id. ¶ 106(1)(a)–(b). 
116 Id. ¶ 106(1)(c). 
117 Id. (Hossain, J. and Oxman, J., ad hoc opinion), at 34. 
118 Id. 
119 Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain) 12 R.I.A.A. 281, 296 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1957). 
120 Id. at 301 (As written in the Lac Lanoux Arbitration statement, “La souveraineté 
territoriale joue à la manière d’une présomption. Elle doit fléchir devant toutes les 
obligations internationales, quelle qu’en soit la source, mais elle ne fléchit que devant 
elles.”). 
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concluded that France’s upstream activities did not violate relevant 
treaties; however, it also concluded that France had an independent 
duty to provide information to and consult with Spain and to take 
Spanish interests into account in planning and carrying out the 
project.121 
Similarly, the arbitral tribunal in Island of Palmas122 concluded that 
even if territorial sovereignty involves an exclusive right to execute the 
functions of a state, “[t]his right has as corollary a duty: the obligation 
to protect within the territory the rights of other States.”123 The tribunal 
emphasized that “[t]erritorial sovereignty cannot limit itself to its 
negative side, i.e. to excluding the activities of other States.”124 
Consistent with these decisions, tribunals interpreting UNCLOS 
have concluded that the duty to cooperate exists regardless of where an 
activity occurs. For example, the tribunal in the Land Reclamation case 
reached its conclusions even though Singapore’s activities took place 
in territorial waters.125 In the Chagos arbitration, the tribunal made its 
conclusions while interpreting the duty to cooperate with respect to 
areas subject to sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction.126 
In Request for Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional 
Fisheries Commission (SRFC Advisory Opinion), ITLOS specifically 
discussed the nature and scope of the duty to cooperate in the context 
of shared natural resources.127 Noting that UNCLOS Article 63 for 
straddling stocks and Article 64 for high migratory stocks impose a 
duty of cooperation with appropriate organizations, ITLOS stated that 
the duty to cooperate requires coastal states fishing for straddling and 
highly migratory stocks to take measures “consistent and compatible 
with those taken by the appropriate regional organization . . . both 
121 Id. at 315–16. 
122 Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
123 Id. at 839; see also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (8th ed. 2012) (explaining that States have sovereignty over their 
territory; “[t]he legal competence of states and the rules for their protection depend on and 
assume the existence of this stable, physically identified (and normally legally delimited) 
base.”). 
124 Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 839. 
125 Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), 
Provisional Measures, 2003 ITLOS Rep. 10 (Oct. 8), ¶ 2 (noting that the dispute related to 
reclamation activities in the Straits of Johor); see also UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 34(2) 
(explaining that straits are by definition territorial waters). 
126 See Chagos Arbitration, Mauritius v. U.K., 2011-03 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), ¶ 503. 
127 Request for Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, 
Advisory Opinion, 2015 ITLOS Rep. 4, ¶ 207 (Apr. 2) [hereinafter SRFC Advisory 
Opinion]. 
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within and beyond the exclusive economic zones.”128 In addition, the 
duty to cooperate arises irrespective of a coastal state’s sovereign right 
to exploit the natural resources of its exclusive economic zone because 
states other than the coastal state have “corresponding rights” in highly 
migratory species.129 Moreover, the duty to give due regard to the rights 
of other states, even when acting within one’s own exclusive economic 
zone, flows not only from the duty to cooperate but also the express 
provisions of UNCLOS Articles 56 and 58, as well as the “fundamental 
principle underlined in [A]rticles 192 and 193” to protect and preserve 
the marine environment.130 
ITLOS further observed that the duty to cooperate under Article 64 
is a “due diligence” obligation that requires the states concerned to 
consult with one another in good faith, pursuant to Article 300 of 
UNCLOS, which provides that “States Parties shall fulfil in good faith 
the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the 
rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a 
manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.”131 These 
consultations “should be meaningful in the sense that substantial effort 
should be made by all States concerned, with a view to adopting 
effective measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation 
and development of shared stocks.”132 To ensure that the interests of 
other states are not undermined, coastal states “must consult each other 
when setting up management measures for those shared stocks to 
coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such 
stocks”133 and take into account the whole range of the species.134 
128 Id. 
129 Id. ¶ 205. 
130 Id. ¶ 216; see also UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 56(2) (“In exercising its rights and 
performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal 
State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner 
compatible with the provisions of this Convention.”); see also id. art. 58(3) (“In exercising 
their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic 
zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall 
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the 
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not 
incompatible with this Part.”). 
131 UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 300; see also Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: 
N.Z. Intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 226 (Mar. 31), ¶ 83 (the ICJ observing that 
“the States parties to the ICRW have a duty to co-operate with the IWC and the Scientific 
Committee and thus should give due regard to recommendations calling for an assessment 
of the feasibility of non-lethal alternatives” to killing whales). 
132 SRFC Advisory Opinion, supra note 127, ¶ 210. 
133 Id. ¶ 212. 
134 See id. ¶ 214. 
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ITLOS emphasized that the duty to cooperate to conserve and manage 
highly migratory species (as well as straddling stocks) applies to “each 
and every State Party concerned”135 and that this duty applies 
irrespective of the right, found in Article 56, of a coastal state to exploit 
natural resources in its exclusive economic zone.136 ITLOS concluded 
that under Article 64, parties to a regional fisheries management 
organization “have the right . . . to require cooperation from non-
Member States whose nationals fish for [a highly migratory species] in 
the region, ‘directly or through appropriate international organizations 
with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of 
optimum utilization of such species.’”137 
C. The Duty to Prepare a Transboundary Environmental
Impact Assessment 
Both the ICJ and ITLOS have concluded that activities of a state that 
may adversely affect the environment or resources of another state 
trigger the need to prepare a transboundary EIA. In Pulp Mills, the ICJ 
declared that an EIA is required for activities that “may be liable to 
cause transboundary harm.”138 The ICJ noted that EIA “has gained so 
much acceptance among States that it may now be considered a 
requirement under general international law . . . where there is a risk 
that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse 
impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared 
resource.”139 
This case concerned the construction of pulp mills along a shared 
waterway, the River Uruguay, but the Court’s analysis has broader 
application. The Court stated that 
due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and prevention which it 
implies, would not be considered to have been exercised, if a party 
planning works liable to affect the régime of the river or the quality 
of its waters did not undertake an environmental impact assessment 
on the potential effects of such works.140 
135 Id. ¶ 215. 
136 Id. ¶ 216. 
137 Id. ¶ 218. 
138 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Pulp Mills) (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 204, 
(Apr. 20) https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/135/135-20100420-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XPV9-SVBD]. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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The ICJ acknowledged that the EIA must be performed consistently 
with domestic law because international law did not prescribe the 
specific elements of an EIA.141 Nonetheless, the state performing the 
EIA must “hav[e] regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed 
development and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well 
as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an 
assessment.”142 In the context of Japan’s commercial whaling, 
consequently, Japan was required to prepare a transboundary EIA143 
and consult with potentially affected states and IWC members prior to 
whaling.144 
Similarly, ITLOS directed Singapore to carry out an EIA when its 
reclamation activities in the Straits of Johor had the potential to 
adversely affect areas within Malaysia’s territorial marine waters.145 
Whereas ITLOS placed its transboundary EIA requirement in the 
context of the duty to cooperate, the ICJ did not.146 Instead, the ICJ 
expressly made its conclusion by finding the duty within “general 
international law.”147 Moreover, the Court prefaced its conclusion by 
recalling its advisory opinion in Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons.148 In that opinion, the ICJ recognized that “[t]he 
existence of the general obligations of States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of 
international law relating to the environment.”149 Thus, the Court 
141 Id. ¶ 205. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. ¶ 119, 206. 
145 Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. 
Singapore), Provisional Measures, 2003 ITLOS Rep. 10 (Oct. 8), ¶ 106. 
146 Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. ¶ 204. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. ¶ 193 (citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 29 (July 8), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/ 
95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGP5-PMWS]). The Court 
iterated this statement in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, at 
20 (Sept. 25), ¶ 53. 
149 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 148, ¶ 29. The 
formulation of the ICJ’s decision is also consistent with the Rio Declaration and Stockholm 
Declaration, both of which put the duty in the context of harm to areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration provides 
States have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
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placed the duty to prepare an EIA in the larger context of the duty not 
to cause transboundary harm and, importantly, described 
transboundary harm both in terms of interstate harm and harm to areas 
beyond national jurisdiction. 
III 
THE DUTY TO COOPERATE THROUGH THE IWC AS THE 
“APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION” 
As various decisions of the ICJ and international tribunals make 
clear, the duty to cooperate requires states to give due regard to the 
rights and duties of states when they undertake various activities. In 
addition, in SRFC Advisory Opinion, ITLOS specifically concluded 
that Articles 61, 63, and 64 of UNCLOS establish a “cooperation 
regime” for the conservation, management, and optimum utilization of 
shared fisheries resources.150 The manner in which states give due 
regard to the rights of other states for shared fisheries resources is 
through the appropriate organization. 
The same conclusion holds for cetaceans. States have sovereign 
rights to exploit living marine resources in their exclusive economic 
zones under Article 56(1) of UNCLOS, but they also have 
corresponding duties to conserve and manage them under Article 61. 
Moreover, Articles 65 and 120 direct UNCLOS parties to cooperate 
through the “appropriate international organizations” for the 
conservation, management, and study of cetaceans.151 As with Articles 
63 and 64, Articles 65 and 120 establish a cooperation regime through 
which states give due regard to the rights of other states.152 
The nature of Japan’s duty to cooperate and the requirement to 
cooperate through the IWC does not change if the conservation and 
management of the whales that Japan hunts is considered with respect 
to highly migratory fish stocks under Article 64 or cetaceans under 
Articles 65 and 120. Articles 65 and 120 specify that, with respect to 
cetaceans, the duty to cooperate (1) “shall” be implemented through the 
appropriate international organizations and (2) applies both in the 
exclusive economic zone (Article 65) and the high seas (Article 120). 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Rio Declaration, supra note 95, at Principle 2 (emphasis added); see also Stockholm 
Declaration, supra note 95, at Principle 21. 
150 SRFC Advisory Opinion, supra note 127, ¶¶ 201, 203, 213. 
151 UNCLOS, supra note 7, arts. 65, 120. 
152 See id. arts. 63, 64, 65, 120. 
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These provisions expressly incorporate the duty to cooperate (“States 
shall cooperate”) for conservation of marine mammals and specify how 
that cooperation must take place: Parties shall “work through” the 
appropriate international organizations for the conservation, 
management, and study of cetaceans.153 
Similarly, Article 64 also requires parties to cooperate “directly or 
through appropriate international organizations” to conserve and 
promote the objective of optimum utilization of highly migratory 
species that are included in UNCLOS Annex I.154 Annex I expressly 
includes many cetaceans, including the minke, sei, and Bryde’s 
whales155 that Japan hunts. 
Most scholars assume that the inclusion of cetacean species in 
Annex I is a mistake originating from UNCLOS’s long, complex 
negotiation and that Article 65 controls.156 The extensive discussion of 
cetacean conservation, management, and study under Article 65 also 
supports the view that the inclusion of some cetaceans as “highly 
migratory” for purposes of Article 64 is a mistake. Despite this 
extensive discussion, the available negotiating texts do not show any 
delegate making a connection between Articles 64 and 65.157 
153 Id. art. 65. 
154 Id. art. 64, Annex I. 
155 Id. Annex I (listing the following cetaceans as highly migratory: Family 
Physeteridae; Family Balaenopteridae; Family Balaenidae; Family Eschrichtiidae; Family 
Monodontidae; Family Ziphiidae; and Family Delphinidae. Sperm whales are in the family 
Physeteridae. The minke whale, the sei whale, the blue whale, the fin whale, the humpback 
whale, and Bryde’s whale are in the family Balaenopteridae. The gray whale is in the family 
Eschrichtiidae. Right whales and bowhead whales are in the family Balaenidae.). 
156 Id. arts. 61, 62, 64. The negotiating history does not illuminate why some cetaceans 
are also referenced in Article 64. Article 64 relates to highly migratory species included in 
Annex I of the Convention. It requires Parties to cooperate through appropriate international 
organizations for the conservation and optimal utilization. However, the concepts of 
conservation, maximum sustainable yield, and optimum utilization already apply to all 
living resources of the exclusive economic zone and high seas. Id. arts. 61, 62, 117–19. The 
weight of scholarship views the inclusion of some cetaceans in Annex I as highly migratory 
species as a mistake deriving from a complex negotiation. William T. Burke, The Law of 
the Sea Convention Provisions on Conditions of Access to Fisheries Subject to National 
Jurisdiction, 63 OR. L. REV. 73, 115 (1984) (stating that the inclusion of cetaceans in Article 
64 represents a “technical error arising from the fact that at one time articles 64 and 65 were 
one article”); CAMERON S. G. JEFFERIES, MARINE MAMMAL CONSERVATION AND THE LAW 
OF THE SEA 183, 191 (2016). But see Kimberly S. Davis, International Management of 
Cetaceans Under the New Law of the Sea Convention, 3 BOS. U. INT’L L.J. 477, 500 (1985) 
(stating that Article 65 modifies the basic structure of Article 64 for listed cetaceans). 
157 See generally UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A 
COMMENTARY VOLUME II, 660, 662 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter 
UNCLOS: A COMMENTARY]; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Mar. 11, 
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Even if it is not a mistake, the nature of Japan’s duty to cooperate 
does not change. Article 64, on the one hand, and Articles 65 and 120, 
on the other, require cooperation through the appropriate international 
organizations.158 Further, neither requires a specific management 
regime. Article 64 requires cooperation “with a view to . . . promoting 
optimum utilization,” but it does not require optimum utilization.159 
Article 65 expressly provides that UNCLOS parties may prohibit, limit, 
or regulate marine mammals more strictly than provided by MSY and 
optimum utilization.160 But Article 65, while not mandating optimum 
utilization, does not preclude it; nor does it require regulation stricter 
than MSY and optimum utilization. Articles 61 and 62, which apply to 
all marine living resources including cetaceans, contemplate optimum 
utilization and maximum sustainable yield.161 In any event, the ICRW 
has the twin goals of conservation and utilization,162 and it has been 
fulfilling those goals through its binding regulations, and consequently, 
Japan should cooperate through the IWC as the appropriate 
international organization to pursue those goals. 
Moreover, ITLOS has already interpreted the duty to cooperate 
under Article 64 as requiring a party to take measures “consistent and 
compatible” with those adopted by the appropriate international 
organization.163 As ITLOS has made clear, the nature of the duty to 
cooperate is a function of the rights of the respective parties.164 Thus, 
even if UNCLOS grants parties sovereign rights to explore, exploit, 
conserve, and manage the living resources in their exclusive economic 
zones under Article 56, those rights are framed not only by the duty to 
cooperate with the appropriate international organization and the rights 
2004, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-10 (2004), https://www.congress.gov/108/crpt/erpt10/ 
CRPT-108erpt10.pdf [hereinafter UNCLOS S. TREATY] (recalling the negotiating history 
of Article 65). Many but not all documents forming the travaux préparatoires can be found 
at the following citation. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. 
DIPLOMATIC CONF., https://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/1958_los [https://perma.cc/ 
P2DW-6CJR] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
158 UNCLOS, supra note 7, arts. 65, 120. 
159 Id. art. 65. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. arts. 61, 62. 
162 ICRW, supra note 1, prmb., art. V. 
163 SRFC Advisory Opinion, supra note 127, ¶ 207(iii). 
164 Id. ¶¶ 213–216. 
2020] Japan's Whaling and Duty to Cooperate with the IWC 111 
held by members of such organization but also by the rights held by 
states in shared resources, such as whales.165 
A. The IWC Is the “Appropriate International Organization”
Without question, the IWC is the “appropriate international
organization” for the conservation, management, and study of 
cetaceans under Article 65 or for ensuring conservation and promoting 
the objective of optimum utilization of highly migratory cetaceans 
under Article 64. Indeed, the IWC is the only organization that 
conserves, manages, and studies, as well as ensures the optimum 
utilization of, whales on a global basis.166 
Concerning the study of cetaceans, the IWC has been engaged in 
long-term efforts to develop population estimates for IWC-managed 
species. With respect to minke, sei, and Bryde’s whales in the North 
Pacific, as well as other species of whale, it has been engaged in long-
term efforts to understand the structure of the stocks.167 The IWC’s 
Scientific Committee meets annually to assess the conservation status 
of the stocks, the ecosystem functions provided by cetaceans,168 and 
many other issues of vital importance to the conservation and 
management of cetaceans.169 
To fulfill its duty to conserve and manage cetaceans, the IWC meets 
biennially to discuss the work of the Scientific Committee and to 
develop new rules for the conservation and management of 
cetaceans.170 It has adopted rules for the conservation and management 
165 Id. ¶ 216 (providing that in exercising its rights and performing duties under this 
Convention in an exclusive economic zone under articles 56(2) and 58(3), the State shall 
“have due regard to the rights and duties” of other States and shall act in a manner 
compatible with the provisions of this Convention and the law of the relevant coastal State). 
166 ICRW, supra note 1, art. I(2) (applying the ICRW “to all waters in which whaling is 
prosecuted by such factory ships, land stations, and whale catchers”). 
167 See generally Scientific Committee Reports, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, 
https://iwc.int/reports [https://perma.cc/D3RX-RUCH] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
168 INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, Resolution on Advancing the Commission’s Work 
on the Role of Cetaceans in the Ecosystem Functioning, Res. 2018-2 (Sept. 2018) 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/download.php?ref=7607&size=&ext=pdf&k=&alternative=-
1&usage=-1&usagecomment= [https://perma.cc/SPE9-GDJ9]. 
169 See Scientific Committee Home Page, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, https://iwc.int/ 
scmain [https://perma.cc/7RCN-V5GT] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
170 ICRW, supra note 1, arts. V–VI (setting out authority of the IWC); INT’L WHALING 
COMMISSION, Rules of Procedure and Financial Regulations, § B(1) (Sept. 2018) 
[hereinafter IWC, Rules of Procedure] (requiring biennial meetings after amendment by the 
Commission at the 67th meeting). 
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of whales in order to protect whales from entanglement,171 noise,172 and 
other anthropogenic threats, such as bycatch.173 
Moreover, the IWC seeks to ensure the sustainability (or optimal 
utilization if the words of Article 64 of UNCLOS are used) of any 
whaling. The IWC has adopted binding regulations relating to factory 
ship operations, land station operations, and the types of harpoons that 
may be used.174 It has adopted rules and catch limits for aboriginal 
subsistence whaling based on subsistence need and the sustainability 
of the catch.175 It has adopted rules for whaling for purposes of 
scientific research under Article VIII of the ICRW.176 With respect to 
commercial whaling, it has adopted the Revised Management 
Procedure (RMP), based on the advice of the Scientific Committee, to 
calculate sustainable catch levels of baleen whales.177 It has established 
size and catch limits.178 It has established inspection and information 
requirements.179 No other international organization has a mandate to 
cover this range of activities concerning the conservation, 
management, and study of whales, as well as the regulation of whaling 
on a global basis. No other international organization has so 
comprehensively conserved, managed, and studied cetaceans. 
Japan has argued that the continuation of the moratorium on 
commercial whaling is antagonistic to sustainable use of whale 
resources.180 In fact, the inability of the Scientific Committee to provide 
171 See, e.g., INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, Resolution on Ghost Gear Entanglement 
Among Cetaceans, Res. 2018-3 (Sept. 2018). 
172 See, e.g., INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, Resolution on Anthropogenic Underwater 
Noise, Res. 2018-4 (Sept. 2018). 
173 See, e.g., Conservation and Management, Bycatch, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, 
https://iwc.int/bycatch [https://perma.cc/T739-A2SU] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) 
(including a Bycatch Mitigation Initiative in its work program). 
174 Schedule, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2–8. 
175 Id. ¶ 13. 
176 INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, Resolution on Special Permits for Scientific 
Research, Res. 1986-2 (1986), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/download.php?ref=2061&size= 
&ext=pdf&k=&alternative=3171&usage=-1&usagecomment= [https://perma.cc/5N36-
JF8B] (recommending that when considering a proposed special permit under Article VIII, 
a State party should take into account whether “the objectives of the research are not 
practically and scientifically feasible through non-lethal research techniques”). 
177 The Revised Management Procedure—A Detailed Account, INT’L WHALING 
COMMISSION, https://iwc.int/rmp2 [https://perma.cc/VLW3-M9UN] (last visited Mar. 13, 
2020). 
178 Schedule, supra note 1, ¶¶ 10, 15–18. 
179 Id. ¶¶ 21–29. 
180 THE WAY FORWARD OF THE IWC: IWC REFORM PROPOSAL IN A DRAFT 
RESOLUTION AND PROPOSED SCHEDULE AMENDMENT, JAPAN, INT’L WHALING 
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population estimates for many stocks181 indicates that the IWC, by 
maintaining the moratorium, is seeking to ensure that any catch limits 
are sustainable in order to prevent the continuing decline of whale 
populations that have been decimated by commercial whaling.182 The 
amount of uncertainty is particularly acute with respect to those stocks 
that Japan hunts, and the IWC’s Scientific Committee has been trying 
to answer questions relating to the structure of the stocks that Japan is 
now hunting: 
• North Pacific sei whales (Balaenoptera borealis) are found on
the high seas as well as the waters of Canada, Russia, and the
United States.183 The species is currently undergoing a
comprehensive assessment to determine, among other things,
whether the population constitutes one or even five separate
stocks.184 The Scientific Committee believes that the evidence
for five stocks “is weak”185 and “agrees that the genetic and
mark-recapture data currently available are consistent with a sei
whales single stock in the pelagic region of the North Pacific,”186
but the question remains unresolved. The Scientific Committee
has further noted the challenges of distinguishing sei whales
from Bryde’s whales (Balaenoptera brydei).187 In 2016, it
reduced the population estimate for North Pacific sei whales due
to misreporting of other species as sei whales during the
COMMISSION, IWC 67/08, at 4 (July 12, 2018) (proposing a draft resolution and proposed 
amendment to the Schedule by Japan). 
181 See Whales Population Estimates, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, https://iwc.int/ 
estimate [https://perma.cc/5M9E-QZRF] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
182 Whales Population Status, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, https://iwc.int/status 
[https://perma.cc/EM3C-2P8J] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) (noting that a number of species, 
including sei, right, humpback, gray, and other whale species were “heavily exploited” 
during the commercial whaling era and their populations have not recovered); see also Rio 
Declaration, supra note 95, at Principle 15 (implementing the precautionary principle in the 
moratorium). The precautionary principle provides that “[w]here there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” Id. 
183 REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON IN-DEPTH ASSESSMENTS, INT’L WHALING 
COMMISSION, Annex G, § 4 (2017), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/download.php?ref=6410 
&size=&ext=pdf&k=&alternative=3301&usage=-1&usagecomment= [https://perma.cc/ 
7VZH-D8US]. 
184 REPORT OF THE 67TH MEETING OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE, INT’L WHALING 
COMMISSION, IWC/67/Rep01, § 9.1.2 (May 5, 2018), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/ 
download.php?ref=6940&size=&ext=pdf&k=&alternative=-1&usage=-1&usage 
comment= [https://perma.cc/JP4T-VHTQ]. 
185 REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, 
IWC/66/Rep01, § 10.6.1.3, (2016), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=6127&k= 
[https://perma.cc/6YCK-MEF6]; see also id. § 12.1.2 (noting that research has not identified 
genetic heterogeneity among sei whales). 
186 Id. § 12.1.2. 
187 Id. § 10.6.1.2. 
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commercial whaling era.188 In other words, significant 
uncertainty exists with regard to this stock of sei whales. 
• The precise range of Bryde’s whale is not known because of
incomplete information relating to stock structure.189 At a
minimum, however, the stock is shared with the United States
and perhaps with some Pacific Island States, such as the
Federated States of Micronesia and Palau.190
• The IWC recognizes three stocks of minke whales in the North
Pacific (Balaenoptera acutorostrata scammoni), two of which
can be found in Japan. However, as the Scientific Committee
noted in 2018, the stock structure of the North Pacific minke
whale “has been a matter of controversial debate without
agreement,” but that analyses “consistently inferred two genetic
clusters”: the J-stock and the O-stock.191 However, even at the
genetic level, individual whales may be wrongly assigned to the
incorrect stock.192 The range of the “J-stock” includes the
Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and Sea of Japan and, thus, the
waters of Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea.193 The
second, known as the “O stock,” lives in the waters of Japan,
Korea, and Russia.194 Genetic analyses indicate that the ranges
of the “O” and “J” stocks overlap; the two stocks “share the same
feeding ground and they are mixed in the Okhotsk Sea and
Japanese coasts” but uncertainties remain. While earlier research
suggested that the J-stock whales occurred within the Sea of
Japan and the O-stock in the Pacific Ocean, the newer analyses
present a “more complicated” picture; genetic evidence now
shows that “J-stock type whales are found along the Pacific coast
of Japan, and there are other indications of possible genetic
differences within the Sea of Japan between the Korean
coast and the Japanese coast.” This report concludes that “a
188 Id. 
189 Id. § 12.1.2. 
190 See WESTERN NORTH PACIFIC BRYDE’S WHALE IMPLEMENTATION: REPORT OF THE 
FIRST INTERSESSIONAL WORKSHOP, J. CETACEAN RES. MGMT. 9 (SUPPL.) 407, 408 (2007). 
191 REPORT OF THE 67TH MEETING OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE, supra note 184, 
¶ 4.5. 
192 Id.
193 Whales Population Status, supra note 182. 
194 NAOHISA KANDA ET AL., GENETIC ANALYSIS OF WESTERN NORTH PACIFIC MINKE 
WHALES FROM KOREA AND JAPAN BASED ON MICROSATELLITE DNA 1, SC/62/NPM11 
(2010), https://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/SC-62-NPM11.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9CL-AR9V] 
(“In summary, we accept the previous view that main stocks inhabiting the Korean and 
Japanese waters were the J and O stock.”); Mutsuo Goto, Mioko Taguchi & Luis A. Pastene, 
Distribution and Movement of ‘O’ and ‘J’ Stock Common Minke Whales in Waters Around 
Japan Based on Genetic Assignment Methods, in TECHNICAL REPORTS OF THE INSTITUTE 
OF CETACEAN RESEARCH 37 (2017), https://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/TEREP00137-43.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TA4G-863D]; TAKASHI HAKAMADA, EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS ON 
WHALE STOCKS OF FUTURE JARPN II CATCHES 3, SC/J09/JR36, https://www.icrwhale. 
org/pdf/SC-J09-JR36.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EQG-VSRV]. 
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comparison between the two coasts of Japan is complicated (in 
part because of the lack of data and the possible mixing between 
‘J’ and ‘O’ stocks in Pacific coastal waters), but it is plausible 
that there are different ‘J-stocks’ on either coast of Japan, and 
some evidence suggests this is the case” and that “it is plausible 
there is a coastal ‘O-stock’ on the Pacific coast of Japan that is 
different from the ‘O-stock’ in pelagic waters, and some 
evidence suggests this is the case.”  
In other words, significant questions remain unanswered, and the 
Scientific Committee is working to answer them. If Japan continues 
commercial whaling on these stocks without cooperating with the IWC, 
it risks undermining the work of the IWC and its Scientific Committee 
to conserve, manage, and study these stocks. In doing so, it poses 
significant risks to the rights of IWC members, particularly those that 
share these stocks. Because of the large data gaps for these and other 
species, the continuing moratorium on commercial whaling is 
consistent with the IWC’s obligation “to provide for the proper 
conservation of whale stocks”195 and their proper regulation to prevent 
endangerment.196 Moreover, it is consistent with the IWC’s authority 
to amend the Schedule for the “conservation and utilization” of whales 
“based on scientific findings.”197 
In addition, because the stocks that Japan hunts are shared stocks, 
even if Japan restricts its whaling to its territorial seas and exclusive 
economic zone, its whaling will affect the rights of other states in those 
stocks. Japan has not indicated that it would hunt other species, but the 
other species found in Japan’s waters that Japan could possibly hunt 
are also shared stocks: 
• The North Pacific fin whale (Balaenoptera physalus), which is
considered a single stock or subspecies,198 is found in Japan as
well as the United States in both Hawaii and California.199
195 ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. art. V(1)–(2). 
198 Frederick I. Archer et al., Mitogenomic Phylogenetics of Fin Whales (Balaenoptera 
physalus spp.): Genetic Evidence for Revision of Subspecies, 8 PLOS ONE e63396 (2013), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0063396 
[https://perma.cc/FW4K-Z6PQ]. 
199 See Sally A. Mizroch et al., Distribution and Movements of Fin Whales in the North 
Pacific Ocean, 39 MAMMAL REV. 193 (2009) (stating that the North Pacific fin whale is 
found “from the Chukchi Sea south to 35° N on the Sanriku coast of Honshu, to the Subarctic 
Boundary (ca. 42° N) in the western and central Pacific, and to 32° N off the coast of 
California”). 
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• The Western North Pacific stock of humpback whales (Megaptera
novaeangliae) inhabits the waters of Japan, the Philippines,
Taiwan, and the Marshall Islands.200
• The critically endangered population of Western North Pacific
gray whales (Eschrichtius robustus) is shared among Japan,
Russia, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, and the United States.201
• The North Pacific right whale (Eubalaena japonica) inhabits the
waters of Japan, Russia, and the United States.202
As such, it is critical—and required—that Japan cooperate with the 
IWC. It is the one international organization with decades of experience 
conserving, managing, and studying these stocks, and the one 
international organization with the geographic scope to cover the full 
range of the stocks.  
As discussed in Section II.B.2, the ICJ and ITLOS have made clear 
that the duty to cooperate exists regardless of where the activity occurs, 
including territorial waters. The relevant question is whether the 
activity affects the rights of other states, not the location of the activity. 
Consequently, Japan must cooperate through the IWC even if it limits 
its whaling to its exclusive economic zone. 
In summary, whether viewed in the context of Article 64 or Article 
65, Japan must cooperate through the IWC because the IWC is the 
appropriate international organization. As a consequence, the rules and 
regulations of the IWC provide a source for determining the rights that 
must be considered as part of the duty to cooperate. 
B. Japan Cannot Fulfill Its Duty to Cooperate Through Another
International Organization 
With respect to cetaceans, Article 65 requires parties to fulfill their 
duty to cooperate through “the appropriate international 
organizations.” The use of the plural “organizations,” however, does 
not allow Japan to use an organization different from the IWC to fulfill 
200 See M. M. Muto et al., Humpback Whale (Megaptera novaeangliae): Western North 
Pacific Stock, ALASKA MARINE MAMMAL STOCK ASSESSMENTS, 2018 205, 205–06 (2018), 
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/webdam/download/92736479 [https://perma.cc/P88N-
E3GC]; see Jo Marie V. Acebes, J.D. Darling & Manami Yamaguchi, Status and 
Distribution of Humpback Whales (Megaptera novaeangliae) in Northern Luzon, 
Philippines, 9 J. CETACEAN RES. MGMT. 37, 37 (2007). 
201 Western North Pacific Gray Whale, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, https://iwc.int/ 
western-gray-whale-cmp [https://perma.cc/7XVL-UY2F] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
202 North Pacific Right Whale, U.S. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, https://www. 
mmc.gov/priority-topics/species-of-concern/north-pacific-right-whale [https://perma.cc/
B2TP-YR5N] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020).
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its duty to cooperate. As described in Section 1 below, the ordinary 
meaning of Article 65 and the UNCLOS negotiating history compel 
this answer. In any event, as described in Section 2 below, no other 
international organization covers the geographic area covered by 
Japan’s whaling or, if it does, it is an organization that does not manage 
whales. 
1. A New Organization Specific to Japanese Whaling
Even if Japan creates a new organization applicable to the whales it
hunts in the North Pacific, it must still cooperate through the IWC. 
First, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides that treaties shall be interpreted in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty.203 The ordinary 
meaning directs us to interpret “the” and “organizations” to mean that 
parties must cooperate through all appropriate organizations. The use 
of “the” and not “an” before “appropriate international organizations” 
indicates that the UNCLOS negotiators did not intend parties to pick 
and choose the appropriate organization or that participation in one 
appropriate organization obviates the need to participate in other 
appropriate organizations. 
In fact, when Canada argued that, under Article 65, “there is no 
obligation on any State to ‘work through’ more than one appropriate 
international organization,”204 scholars were quick to criticize that view 
as “implausible”205 and “not . . . consistent with Article 65.”206 Another 
203 The Vienna Convention directs States to interpret treaties “in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in light of its object and purposes.” Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 31. 
204 Statement by the Delegation of Canada, NINTH SESSION THIRD U.N. CONF. L. SEA, 
A/Conf.62/WS/4 (Apr. 2, 1980), https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../diplomaticconferences/ 
1973_los/docs/english/vol_13/a_conf62_ws_4.pdf&lang=E [https://perma.cc/Q4XK-
8MPT]. This history can also be found in JEFFERIES, supra note 156, at 183. 
205 Davis, supra note 156, at 505–06 (stating that “the Canadian statement is 
implausible” and “must be rejected as contrary to the plain meaning of article 65, 
unsupported by supplementary means of treaty interpretation, and contrary to the basic tenet 
of the Convention of uniform international management of migratory and highly migratory 
species.”). 
206 Professor William Burke writes that 
[t]he argument that whales are not subject to the ICRW is difficult to follow, in light
of the straightforward provision in [UNCLOS]. Perhaps it stems from the belief that
[UNCLOS] overrides the ICRW and reinstalls coastal state authority over whales.
This position does not seem consistent with [A]rticle 65, which indicates the clear
expectation regarding cetaceans that states shall work through the appropriate
international organizations for their conservation, management and study.
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scholar concluded that the interpretation “defeat[s] the objectives of 
this Article.”207 Canada’s view is clearly inconsistent with the ordinary 
meaning of Article 65,208 which requires parties to work though “the 
appropriate international organizations.” The use of “the” instead of 
“an” indicates that UNCLOS negotiators rejected a cooperation regime 
based on the ability of parties to choose which organization they 
deemed appropriate and that participation in one appropriate 
organization does not obviate the need to participate in other 
appropriate organizations. That language requires, as scholars report, 
“positive action in good faith” with the IWC.209 In any event, despite 
being a non-member of the IWC, Canada recognizes the IWC as the 
appropriate international organization to work through with respect to 
the bowhead whales hunted by First Nations in Canada.210 
Second, a small, regional body does not qualify as an “appropriate 
international organization.” UNCLOS includes a number of provisions 
relating to cooperation through appropriate organizations. At times, 
it requires cooperation through “sub-regional and regional” 
organizations, as when it describes the duty to cooperate with respect 
to straddling stocks211 and anadromous stocks.212 At other times, 
as with marine mammals and highly migratory species, it directs 
cooperation through “international” organizations.213 Treaty 
interpreters must give terms their ordinary meaning and, in doing so, 
give meaning to differences in language.214 
WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982 AND 
BEYOND 268 (1994). UNCLOS also provides that it does not alter the rights and obligations 
of Parties arising from compatible agreements. UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 311. 
207 McDorman, supra note 88, at 183 (citing Patricia W. Birnie, International Protection 
of Whales, Y.B. WORLD AFF. 240, 259 (1983)). 
208 Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 31. 
209 McDorman, supra note 88, at 187; BURKE, supra note 206, at 268. 
210 See McDorman, supra note 88, at 185, 187 (citing Dan Goodman, Land Claim 
Agreements and the Management of Whaling in the Canadian Arctic, in THE PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE 11TH SYMPOSIUM: DEVELOPMENT OF NORTHERN PEOPLES 39 (1999)). Canada’s 
recognition of the IWC as the appropriate international organization for management of 
whales is consistent with the mandate of the ICRW and IWC to manage whales and whaling 
on a global basis. The ICRW applies in “all waters” where whaling is prosecuted. ICRW, 
supra note 1, art. I(2). 
211 UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 63. 
212 UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 66(5). 
213 UNCLOS, supra note 7, arts. 64, 65. 
214 Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 31. In the Reformulated Gasoline case, the 
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization was asked to interpret the phrase “relating 
to,” which the panel had interpreted to mean “necessary.” After noting that exceptions of 
Article XX began with different terms, including “essential,” “necessary,” and “relating to,” 
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A document prepared by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs 
(OLA), which lists the IWC and two other organizations as appropriate 
for Article 65 purposes, does not contradict this conclusion.215 The 
OLA makes no distinction between cetaceans and other marine 
mammals, and it describes the table as indicative, not authoritative.216 
Moreover, neither the Food & Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) nor the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), the two other organizations included in the table, regulate 
whaling.217 The inclusion of FAO, however, is consistent with the view 
that other international organizations might regulate bycatch of 
cetaceans in fisheries;218 the negotiating history described below 
suggests that management of bycatch is the reason for the use of the 
plural “organizations” in Article 65. 
Third, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention expressly allows resort 
to supplementary materials, such as the negotiating history, “in order 
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31.”219 
The negotiating history, in fact, supports the view that the IWC is 
the appropriate international organization for the conservation, 
management, and study of cetaceans. Earlier versions of Article 65 
among others, the Appellate Body concluded in light of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
that “[i]t does not seem reasonable to suppose that the WTO Members intended to require, 
in respect of each and every category, the same kind or degree of connection or relationship 
between the measure under appraisal and the state interest or policy sought to be promoted 
or realized.” Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, 18, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted May 20, 1996). 
215 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN ISSUE, OCEAN AFF. & L. SEA 31, 79, 82 (Aug. 23, 1996), 
https://www.un-ilibrary.org/international-law-and-justice/law-of-the-sea-bulletin/volume-
1996/issue-31_4edb8f3d-en [https://perma.cc/U95G-TPP3]. 
216 Id. at 79. 
217 UNEP “sets the global environmental agenda, promotes the coherent implementation 
of the environmental dimension of sustainable development within the United Nations 
system, and serves as an authoritative advocate for the global environment.” About UN 
Environment Programme, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, https://www.unenvironment.org/ 
about-un-environment [https://perma.cc/84LT-DJV5] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
However, it does not have a role in managing natural resources. The FAO’s constitution 
directs it to “collect, analyse, interpret and disseminate information relating to nutrition, 
food and agriculture,” including “fisheries, marine products, forestry and primary forestry 
products,” but it has no mandate with respect to whales and whaling. Constitution of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, art. I, Oct. 16, 1945, 60 Stat. 
1886. 
218 FAO has a long history of addressing bycatch issues. See, e.g., FAO FISHERIES 
TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 339: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF FISHERIES BYCATCH AND 
DISCARDS, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N. (1994); EXPORT WORKSHOP ON MEANS AND 
METHODS FOR REDUCING MARINE MAMMAL MORTALITY IN FISHING AND AQUACULTURE 
OPERATIONS, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N. (2018). 
219 Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 32. 
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referred only to the “appropriate international organization,”220 with 
organization in the singular. However, a delegate from Japan proposed 
to change organization from the singular to the plural in order to allow 
regional fisheries management organizations to manage bycatch of 
cetaceans.221 This view is supported by a U.S. State Department letter 
stating that “[c]ertain regional organizations, which are concerned with 
the regulation of fishing, may also appropriately play a role as 
cetaceans are occasionally taken as incidental catch to fishing 
activities.”222 In other words, UNCLOS uses the plural “organizations” 
to reflect the view that the IWC would manage the direct take of 
cetaceans while other organizations would or could manage bycatch. 
Second, Article 65, which refers to all marine mammals, was drafted 
at a time when several international treaties related to marine mammal 
conservation and management were already operational, including the 
IWC, the 1957 Interim North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty,223 the 1972 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals,224 and the 1973 
Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears.225 Thus, the use of the 
plural “organizations” in Article 65 is not surprising. 
Consistent with these two arguments, floor statements by several 
parties specifically supported the IWC as the appropriate international 
organization226 for Article 65 purposes or supported Article 65 
220 UNCLOS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 157, at 660, 662; UNCLOS S. TREATY, 
supra note 157, at 153 (statement of Patricia Forkan). 
221 UNCLOS S. TREATY, supra note 157, at 153. 
222 A U.S. Department of State official interprets Article 65 as follows: 
The appropriate/primary international organization referred to in Article 65 is the 
International Whaling Commission or a successor organization. Certain regional 
organizations, which are concerned with the regulation of fishing, may also 
appropriately play a role as cetaceans are occasionally taken as incidental catch to 
fishing activities. It is further understood that the minimum international standards 
for the protection of cetaceans apply throughout the migratory range of such 
cetaceans whether within or beyond the exclusive economic zone. 
UNCLOS S. TREATY, supra note 157, at 174 (statement of Patricia Forkan, Exec. Vice 
President, Humane Society of the United States, citing the interpretation drafted by George 
Taft et al. at the last session of the Law of the Sea Conference (Aug. 22, 1980)). 
223 Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, Feb. 9, 1957, 
8 U.S.T. 2283, 314 U.N.T.S. 4546 (expired Oct. 14, 1984). This 1957 agreement replaced 
the Convention between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Preservation 
and Protection of Fur Seals, signed on July 7, 1911. 
224 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, 
1080 U.N.T.S. 16,529 (entered into force Mar. 11, 1978). 
225 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 3918. 
226 Netherlands stated, “We acknowledge the great importance of marine mammal 
conservation, particularly through the IWC.” UNCLOS S. TREATY, supra note 157, at 155 
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generally without commenting on the issue.227 A 1980 letter from a 
U.S. negotiator expressed this understanding of Article 65: 
[Article 65] preserves and enhances the role of 
the International Whaling Commission (or a successor 
organization). It recognizes the role of regional 
organizations in the protection of marine mammals, which 
are often taken incidental to fishing operations. In sum, the 
article is a basic and sound framework with which States 
and international organizations may pursue the future 
protection of these wonderful creatures for generations to 
come.228 
In other words, even if the use of the plural “organizations” is 
intended to refer to organizations in addition to the IWC, that use does 
not indicate that the IWC is not an appropriate international 
organization with respect to conservation, management, and study of 
cetaceans. 
C. Existing Regional Bodies Alone Are Not Adequate to Fulfill
Japan’s Duty to Cooperate 
Even if one accepts that organizations other than the IWC could 
qualify as “appropriate international organizations” for purposes of 
Article 65, other existing organizations do not qualify. Other 
organizations do not cover the geographic range included in Japan’s 
whaling operations, are not international organizations as that term is 
used in international law, or do not manage whaling. 
1. The North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission
The North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) is
not an “appropriate international organization” for purposes of any 
(citing Committee II, Deliberations on Article 65 Amendment, Floor Statements (Mar. 21, 
1980). 
227 Id. at 155 (reporting on the comments of Iceland and Norway). 
228 Id. (quoting Letter from U.S. Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson to Patricia Forkan, 
Exec. Vice President, Humane Society of the United States (Apr. 29, 1980)). A U.S. 
delegation report makes similar conclusions: 
The text [of Article 65] provides a sound framework for the protection of whales and 
other marine mammals . . . . It preserves and enhances the role of the International 
Whaling Commission (or a successor organization) especially, but not exclusively, 
with regard to whales. It recognizes the role of regional organizations in the 
protection of marine mammals, which are often taken incidental to fishing 
operations. 
U.S. DELEGATION REPORT, NINTH SESSION THIRD U.N. CONF. L. SEA 42 (1980). 
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whaling that Japan might undertake.229 First, NAMMCO does not 
apply to Japanese whaling where its vessels plan to hunt (in its 
exclusive economic zone) or have historically hunted (the North Pacific 
and the Southern Ocean) because the scope of NAMMCO is limited to 
the North Atlantic.230 
Second, an organization comprising only two States (Iceland and 
Norway) and two dependent territories (Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands) is inadequate to be considered “appropriate,” as discussed in 
the preceding section. The OLA noted that other organizations could 
become “competent” or “appropriate” in the future with respect to 
relevant UNCLOS provisions, but it did not establish any criteria for 
identifying “competent” or “appropriate” organizations.231 Of the 
organizations included in its table, however, the OLA listed only large 
organizations with broad participation.232 In fact, the IWC appears to 
be the smallest organization included in the list; it had 39 members in 
1996 when OLA drafted the list, and those members were globally 
distributed.233 This suggests that small, regional organizations like 
NAMMCO are not “appropriate international organizations.” 
Iceland and Norway possibly recognize that NAMMCO is not 
“appropriate” within the meaning of Article 65. Iceland, for example, 
was motivated to establish NAMMCO as an alternative to the ICRW 
after it withdrew from that convention in 1992.234 Yet, even with 
229 Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine 
Mammals in the North Atlantic, art. 1, Apr. 9, 1992, 1945 U.N.T.S. 4. 
230 Id. art. 2. 
231 See LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN ISSUE, supra note 215, at 79. 
232 For example, the OLA references large organizations with broad participation such 
as the International Maritime Organization, the World Health Organization, the 
International Labor Organization, United Nations Development Program, and others. Id. at 
81–95. 
233 FORTY-SEVENTH REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, 
INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION (1997), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/ 
download.php?ref=51&size=&ext=pdf&k=&alternative=-1&usage=-1&usagecomment= 
[https://perma.cc/5L8M-8V42]. The list is included in unpaginated front matter and 
indicates membership of small and large States, developed and developing States, as well as 
States from all inhabited continents. 
234 See Alf Hakon Hoel, Regionalization of International Whale Management: The Case 
of the North Atlantic Marine Mammals Commission, 46 ARCTIC 116, 119 (1993) (describing 
NAMMCO’s history and operation); David D. Caron, The International Whaling 
Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks 
of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 154, 163–66 (1995); see also 
Steven Freeland & Julie Drysdale, Co-Operation or Chaos? – Article 65 of United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Future of the International Whaling Commission, 
2 MACQUARIE J. INT’L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 1, 16 n.116 (2005) (citing a press release from 
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NAMMCO operational, Iceland re-ratified the ICRW in 2002, 
suggesting that it believed that its killing of fin and minke whales235—
two species managed by the IWC236—is whaling that should be 
managed by the IWC.237 Similarly, Norway has maintained its IWC 
membership, suggesting that it, too, believes the IWC remains the 
appropriate international organization for the management of minke 
whales in the North Atlantic, which Norway hunts and which the IWC 
conserves, manages, and studies. 
2. The Antarctic Treaty System
Since 1987, Japan has hunted in the Southern Ocean by issuing
special permits under Article VIII of the ICRW.238 Although this area 
and its resources are managed by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS),239 
which includes the Antarctic Treaty and the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (PEPAT),240 it does not constitute an 
appropriate international organization under Articles 65 and 120 with 
respect to Japanese whaling. First and most significantly, the ATS 
applies only to the area south of 60° south latitude,241 and Japan no 
longer plans to whale in this area.242 
Second, even if Japan intended to whale there, the ATS would not 
be considered an appropriate international organization. Neither the 
Antarctic Treaty nor the Protocol expressly excludes cetaceans from 
the Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries stating that “[i]t is, therefore, necessary and appropriate 
to work towards the establishment of a regional organization covering the North Atlantic, 
with particular emphasis on the northernmost areas, where marine mammals are plentiful 
and where management challenges are shared.”). 
235 See Catches Taken: Under Objection or Under Reservation, supra note 38 
(tabulating the species taken by Iceland on an annual basis from 2006 to 2017); see also 
Wold, supra note 44 (discussing a history of Iceland’s return to the ICRW and IWC). 
236 Schedule, supra note 1, at Table 1. 
237 Possibly NAMMCO could be considered “appropriate” for hunting of belugas and 
narwhales as they are not regulated by the IWC, but those species are not at issue under 
Japan’s proposal to resume commercial whaling. 
238 Catches Taken: Special Permit, supra note 47. 
239 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into force 
June 23, 1961). 
240 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Protocol, Annex II, art. 1(a), 
Oct. 4, 1991, 2941 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter PEPAT]. PEPAT “supplements” the Antarctic 
Treaty. Id. art. 4(1). 
241 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 239, art. VI. 
242 Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretariat, supra note 3, ¶ 7 (“From July 2019, after the 
withdrawal comes into effect on June 30, Japan will conduct commercial whaling within 
Japan’s territorial sea and its exclusive economic zone, and will cease the take of whales in 
the Antarctic Ocean/the Southern Hemisphere.”). 
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their jurisdiction; in fact, the Protocol applies to any mammal that 
inhabits or naturally migrates through the convention area.243 
Nonetheless, while the Protocol authorizes the taking of marine 
mammals, it limits that taking to scientific, educational, and other 
purposes.244 None of these purposes would authorize the commercial 
hunt that Japan now contemplates. Moreover, PEPAT limits any taking 
of mammals to “small numbers” and to no more than “strictly 
necessary” to meet the purposes of the taking.245 These limitations also 
preclude any commercial whaling by Japan. 
Third, PEPAT also requires any activities in the ATS convention 
area to be planned and conducted so as to avoid detrimental changes in 
distribution and abundance of species and to avoid further jeopardy to 
endangered or threatened species or populations of species.246 Without 
valid population estimates for minke whales and other whale species in 
the Southern Ocean,247 Japan would not be able to make this affirmative 
finding of no detriment.248 
Fourth, Annex II of PEPAT, relating to protection of fauna and flora, 
provides that “[n]othing in this Annex shall derogate from the rights 
and obligations of Parties under the [ICRW].”249 Any whaling by Japan 
in the Southern Ocean pursuant to PEPAT would adversely affect the 
rights of ICRW Parties. Thus, the Antarctic Treaty and PEPAT cannot 
be considered an appropriate international organization for purposes of 
managing whaling by Japan in the area below 60° south latitude. 
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources (CCAMLR)250 is also part of the ATS. Although CCAMLR 
has its own commission,251 it, too, does not constitute an appropriate 
international organization for purposes of managing Japan’s current 
243 PEPAT, supra note 240, art. 1(a). 
244 Id. art. 3(2). 
245 Id. art. 3(3). 
246 See id. art. 3(2)(c). 
247 Whale Population Estimates, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, https://iwc.int/estimate 
[https://perma.cc/RT7K-62X8] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) (failing to provide any recent 
population estimates for minke or any other whale species in the Sothern Ocean, except 
potentially a 2009 estimate for right whales). 
248 To implement the provision that activities avoid detrimental impacts, PEPAT 
requires proposed activities to be preceded by an EIA. See PEPAT, supra note 240, art. 8. 
249 Id. art. 7. 
250 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 
May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1982), 
https://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation/camlr-convention-text [https://perma.cc/99P6-
GSGE] [hereinafter CCAMLR]. 
251 Id. art. VII. 
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commercial hunt. First, the CCAMLR Convention Area includes the 
Southern Ocean, extending northward to 50° and even 45° south 
latitude in some places,252 areas in which Japan will not whale. 
Second, CCAMLR, while applying to all species of living organisms 
within the convention area,253 provides that “[n]othing in this 
Convention shall derogate from the rights and obligations of 
Contracting Parties under the [ICRW].”254 This provision does not 
operate so as to exclude whales and whaling from the application of 
CCAMLR, but it does ensure that the ICRW prevails to the extent of 
any conflict.255 Japanese whaling in the CCAMLR Convention Area 
would conflict with the rights of ICRW members that are also 
CCAMLR members because the IWC has established a Southern 
Ocean Sanctuary,256 as well as the moratorium on commercial 
whaling.257 Moreover, CCAMLR requires the CCAMLR Commission 
to “take full account of any relevant measures or regulations 
established or recommended . . . by existing fisheries commissions 
responsible for species which may enter the [convention area].”258 If 
the IWC is considered a “fisheries commission” for purposes of this 
provision,259 then the provision provides an additional legal 
requirement for CCAMLR to defer to IWC decisions, including those 
relating to the moratorium and the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. Thus, 
CCAMLR would not be considered an appropriate international 
organization under Article 65 for managing Japanese catches of 
whales. 
252 Id. art. I. For a map of the CCAMLR convention area, see Convention Area, 
COMMISSION CONSERVATION ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RESOURCES, https://www. 
ccamlr.org/en/system/files/CCAMLR-Convention-Area-Map.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8YS-
CTHX] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
253 CCAMLR, supra note 250, art. I(2). 
254 Id. art. VI. 
255 For more on savings clauses, see Deborah Russo, Addressing the Relation Between 
Treaties by Means of ‘Saving Clauses,’ 85 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L. L., 133 (2015). 
256 Schedule, supra note 1, ¶ 7(b). 
257 Id. ¶ 10(e). 
258 CCAMLR, supra note 250, art. IX(5). 
259 Maria Clara Maffei, The Protection of Whales in Antarctica, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW FOR ANTARCTICA 171, 190 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1996). 
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3. The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals
The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals (CMS)260 prohibits the taking261 of endangered migratory 
species included in Appendix I of the convention.262 For Appendix II 
species, those species with an unfavorable conservation status or which 
might benefit from international cooperation,263 CMS parties may 
establish binding or nonbinding agreements for their conservation and 
management.264 Many cetaceans, including those species regulated by 
the IWC, are included in Appendix I or II.265 However, CMS appears 
to defer to the IWC with respect to management measures for 
cetaceans. CMS specifically provides that, with respect to Appendix II 
species, any agreement should “at a minimum, prohibit . . . any taking 
that is not permitted . . . under any other multilateral agreement.”266 
Although it does not mention the IWC by name, the IWC had already 
adopted take prohibitions for right whales and other whales by the time 
CMS was negotiated.267 Presumably, negotiators did not want to take 
action to undermine the work of the IWC. 
260 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23, 
1979, 1651 U.N.T.S. 333 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1983) https://www.cms.int/sites/ 
default/files/instrument/CMS-text.en_.PDF [http://perma.cc/XP9Q-GBWZ] [hereinafter 
CMS]. 
261 Id. art. III(5). 
262 Id. art. III(1) (“Appendix I shall list migratory species which are endangered.”). 
263 CMS defines Appendix II species as follows: 
Appendix II shall list migratory species which have an unfavourable conservation 
status and which require international agreements for their conservation and 
management, as well as those which have a conservation status which would 
significantly benefit from the international co-operation that could be achieved by an 
international agreement. 
Id. art. IV(1). 
264 Id. art. IV(3). 
265 Id. apps. I–II, at 2, 7–8 (effective Jan. 26, 2018). 
266 Id. art. V(4)(f). 
267 The taking of right whales was prohibited even before the ICRW came into force 
pursuant to the 1931 Geneva Convention on the Regulation of Whaling. When the ICRW 
was negotiated and adopted, it carried forward that prohibition. See Barbara Galletti 
Vernazzani et al., Conservation Management Plan for Eastern South Pacific Southern 
Right Whale Population (Eubalaena australis), § 2.1, SC/66b/BRG/23 (Apr. 2016), 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/download.php?ref=6097&size=&ext=pdf&k=&alternative=-
1&usage=-1&usagecomment= [https://perma.cc/JT75-7V83]. 
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Thus, for Appendix I cetacean species, CMS Parties do not manage 
them, instead focusing on conservation.268 For Appendix II cetacean 
species, the parties defer to the IWC. In either circumstance, CMS would 
not appear to be the “appropriate international organization,” or at least 
not the only “appropriate international organization,” for purposes of 
Article 65. 
In addition, CMS does not establish a commission or organization.269 
Even though UNEP provides the Executive Secretary of CMS,270 CMS 
has an identity separate from UNEP.271 These facts also indicate that it 
is not an “appropriate international organization” because it is not an 
organization at all.272 
IV 
HOW JAPAN CAN FULFILL ITS DUTY TO COOPERATE 
In light of ICJ, ITLOS, and other jurisprudence, including 
interpretations specific to UNCLOS, as well as the shared nature and 
conservation status of the minke, Bryde’s, and sei whales that Japan is 
hunting, Japan must implement a range of actions to fulfill its duty to 
cooperate. Japan must “work through” the IWC as the appropriate 
international organization for the conservation, management, and study 
of cetaceans in order to give due regard to the rights and duties of IWC 
members. By working through the IWC, Japan is not necessarily 
required to implement all of the IWC’s rules, but it must comply with 
those rules that are central to the IWC’s mandate to conserve, manage, 
and study cetaceans. Japan cannot give due regard to the rights and 
duties of ICRW parties without, for example, providing the IWC with 
data concerning populations, stock structure, and numbers of animals 
struck and killed because these data are central to implementing the 
ICRW’s dual purposes of conservation and management. Moreover, 
Japan must implement the RMP and, at least until adequate data exists 
to actually use the RMP to ensure the sustainability of catches, prohibit 
268 In addition to the take prohibition, CMS Parties must, among other things, endeavor 
to remove obstacles to migration. CMS, supra note 260, art. III(4). 
269 Instead, it creates a “Conference of the Parties,” a decision-making body that exists 
only during meetings of the Parties. Id. art. VII. 
270 Id. art. IX(3). 
271 For more on the legal personality of conventions and their secretariats, see BHARAT 
H. DESAI, MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL STATUS OF THE 
SECRETARIATS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
272 RALPH ZACKLIN, THE AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIVE INSTRUMENTS OF 
UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES 8 (A.W. Shijthoff ed., 1968) (stating that 
international organizations have a legal identity separate from their member States). 
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commercial whaling. By cooperating with the IWC in these ways, 
Japan also ensures that it is not causing harm to the resources or 
environment of another state or to areas beyond national jurisdiction, 
as described in Section II.B.273 Japan must respect the rights and marine 
environment of other states, as well as areas beyond national 
jurisdiction,274 by engaging meaningfully in IWC processes. 
A. Participation in IWC Meetings
In the context of UNCLOS, Japan has a mandatory duty to “work 
through the appropriate international organizations” by participating in 
relevant meetings of the IWC and the Scientific Committee.275 As one 
scholar notes, “participation in good faith in the work of an 
organization would require a positive contribution or sharing of 
experience, expertise, or information designed to positively assist the 
work of the international organization.”276 A positive contribution 
starts by actually attending relevant meetings that concern the 
conservation and management of the species. That certainly includes 
participation as a non-party state at meetings of the IWC and Scientific 
Committee.277 
Not only does Japan have a duty to cooperate through the IWC but 
ITLOS has also characterized the provisions of UNCLOS as providing 
the appropriate international organization a “right . . . to require 
cooperation from non-Member States.”278 Consistent with this right, 
273 See generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 148; 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, at 20 (Sept. 25), ¶ 53; Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 101, 139 (Apr. 20). 
274 See Rio Declaration, supra note 95, Principle 2; Stockholm Declaration supra note 
95, Principle 21. 
275 UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 65; see also supra Part III. 
276 McDorman, supra note 88, at 186–87. This is similar to the position of Canada, made 
in 1980, the “work through” obligation “can be fulfilled through consultation with the 
scientific bodies of such organizations.” Statement by the Delegation of Canada, supra note 
204, at 104. 
277 The Rules of Procedure for meetings of both the Commission and the Scientific 
Committee allow for participation by non-Member States. IWC, Rules of Procedure, supra 
note 170, C.1(a) (“Any Government not a party to the Convention . . . may be represented 
at meetings of the Commission by an observer or observers); IWC, Rules of Procedure, 
supra note 170, A.4 (non-member governments may be represented at meetings of the 
Scientific Committee). 
278 SRFC Advisory Opinion, supra note 127, ¶ 218. 
2020] Japan's Whaling and Duty to Cooperate with the IWC 129 
the IWC has noted the importance of obtaining contributions from non-
member whaling countries in the past.279 
Moreover, as described in Section II.B.2, the ICJ and ITLOS have 
made clear that the duty to cooperate exists regardless of where the 
activity occurs, including territorial waters, although the duty to 
cooperate through the IWC only applies expressly to whaling in 
exclusive economic zones and the high seas. The relevant question is 
whether the rights of other states are affected, not the location of the 
activity. Consequently, Japan must cooperate by participating in IWC 
meetings even if it limits its whaling to its territorial sea and exclusive 
economic zone. Japan has indicated that it will do so,280 but no IWC 
meetings have taken place since Japan’s withdrawal to determine 
whether Japan will participate in good faith. 
B. Submission of Data on the Whales It Hunts
Good faith participation through the IWC requires more than 
occupying a seat. As noted by the various international tribunals, the 
duty to cooperate requires the sharing of information.281 In the context 
of commercial whaling, Japan must submit data concerning the 
populations of whales that it hunts. In addition, it must include data 
concerning the number of whales landed and whales struck and lost, as 
well as the location of any catches, because these data are central to 
determining the total number of whales within a population and 
whether the hunt is sustainable.282 Moreover, Japan must submit data 
on all whales taken as bycatch and from other anthropogenic sources. 
The submission of this information is central to Japan’s duty to 
cooperate for at least four reasons. First, as noted in Part III, the 
populations of whales that Japan hunts are shared populations. Sei 
279 See, e.g., INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, Resolution on Directed Takes of White 
Whales, Res. 1998-9 (1998), (encouraging non-members, particularly Canada, “to send 
experts to the Scientific Committee . . . meeting . . . to assist its discussions of stock structure 
and abundance estimates of white whale populations”); INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, 
Resolution on Small Populations of Highly Endangered Whales, Res. 1999-7 (1999), 
(encouraging “non-member governments to send appropriate representatives and documents 
to the next meeting of the Scientific Committee to facilitate this work”). 
280 See Letter from Hideki Moronuki, Director, Fisheries Negotiation, to Dr. Robert 
Suydam, Chair, Int’l Whaling Commission Sci. Comm. (July 1, 2019), https://archive. 
iwc.int/pages/download.php?ref=9582&size=&ext=pdf&k=34d7539e86&alternative=-1& 
usage=-1&usagecomment=) [https://perma.cc/4J4U-PA5P]. 
281 See supra Section II.B. 
282 IWC Members must submit this information pursuant to paragraph 27 of the 
Schedule. Schedule, supra note 1, ¶ 27, (as amended Sept. 2018). 
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whales and Bryde’s whales are also found in the high seas.283 Second, 
the stock structures of sei whales and minke whales in the region are 
not fully understood.284 Third, sei whales and Bryde’s whales are very 
difficult to distinguish and their ranges overlap.285 Thus, “[i]ndividuals 
from different biological populations of the same species cannot be 
distinguished at sea (either by scientists when estimating abundance or 
by hunters before catching).”286 Consequently, the Scientific 
Committee needs all the data gathered by Japan to more fully 
understand how to conserve and manage these species. Without these 
data, it is not clear how the rights of IWC members in the proper 
conservation, management, and study of these stocks can be 
maintained; the failure to provide these data would result in significant 
gaps concerning stock size and structure for each of these species. 
Fourth, these data are required to set sustainable catch quotas. The 
IWC uses its Catch Limit Algorithm (CLA) to generate those catch 
quotas, or “catch limits” in IWC jargon. As the IWC states, “Regular 
abundance estimates are essential to the ‘feedback’ way in which the 
CLA works. If no recent abundance estimate is available, catches are 
set to zero.”287 As such, Japan must submit these data so that the 
Scientific Committee can properly evaluate the data, and the IWC has 
all relevant information for making management decisions. Japan must 
also use the guidelines and rules established by the Scientific 
Committee “to ensure abundance estimates are of sufficient quality to 
be used.”288 
Moreover, the Scientific Committee and the IWC need data 
concerning mortalities from bycatch and other anthropogenic sources 
so they can ensure that the RMP generates a sustainable quota. As the 
IWC agreed in IWC Resolution 1998-2, catch limits are calculated 
based on the total allowable removal, and “catch limits for commercial 
purposes for any species of whale in any region shall be calculated by 
deducting all human-induced mortalities that are known or can be 
reasonably estimated, other than commercial catches, from the total 
283 See supra Section III.A. 
284 See supra Section III.A. 
285 See supra Section III.A. 
286 The Revised Management Procedure—A Detailed Account, supra note 177. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. The guidelines and rules can be found in Requirements and Guidelines for 
Conducting Surveys and Analysing Data Within the Revised Management Scheme, 
13 J. CETACEAN RES. MGMT. (SUPPL.) 509 (2012), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/download. 
php?ref=297&size=&ext=pdf&k=&alternative=1049&usage=-1&usagecomment= [https:// 
perma.cc/N6CL-M6J3]. 
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allowable removal.”289 As the IWC has been concerned about 
“[p]articularly high levels” of bycatch of J-stock minke whales in the 
Sea of Japan,290 it is critical that Japan report whatever bycatch 
mortality is associated with its fisheries. 
Sharing these data is consistent with the decisions of the ICJ and 
ITLOS to exchange information.291 It is also consistent with the 
statement by ITLOS that “fisheries conservation and management 
measures, to be effective, should concern the whole stock unit over its 
entire area of distribution or migration routes.”292 Without data from 
an active whaling nation, the IWC cannot conserve and manage 
effectively the relevant whale stocks across their entire area of 
distribution. 
Sharing these data is also consistent with past practice at the IWC. 
For example, in order to calculate the aboriginal whaling catch limit for 
the West Greenland stock of bowhead whales, the Scientific 
Committee asked Canada, an IWC non-member, for data regarding its 
bowhead whale catch, which Canada provided.293 Sharing data on 
whale catches is also consistent with Japan’s many statements about 
the need to make science-based catch limits and its commitment to the 
collection of scientific information that contributes to setting 
sustainable catch limits.294 
Japan has indicated that it will submit information to the Scientific 
Committee.295 To date, however, the information submitted to the 
289 INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, RESOLUTION ON TOTAL CATCHES OVER TIME, RES.  
1998-2 (1998), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/download.php?ref=2073&size=&ext=pdf& 
k=&alternative=3041&usage=-1&usagecomment= [https://perma.cc/7BC5-GQGM]. 
290 Denise Risch et al., Common and Antarctic Minke Whales: Conservation Status 
and Future Research Directions, 6 FRONTIERS MARINE SCI. 1, 5 (2019), https://www. 
frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2019.00247/full [https://perma.cc/56FN-36X6] 
(“Particularly high levels of by-catch and entanglement of the J stock population of minke 
whales, inhabiting the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea, have raised serious 
concerns in the IWC Scientific Committee in recent years.”). 
291 MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2001 ITLOS Rep. 95 
(Dec. 3), ¶ 110; Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malay. 
v. Sing.), Provisional Measures, 2003 ITLOS Rep. 10 (Oct. 8), ¶ 106.
292 SRFC Advisory Opinion, supra note 127, ¶ 214.
293 CHAIR’S REPORT OF THE 63RD MEETING, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, § 7.3.5.1
(2011), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/download.php?ref=1577&size=&ext=pdf&k=9f53f4c 
140&alternative=-1&usage=-1&usagecomment= [https://perma.cc/X9JA-XV5W]. 
294 See, e.g., Opening Statement to the Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Marine Mammal Council, Japan, NORTH ATL. MARINE MAMMAL COUNCIL [NAMMCO], 
NAMMCO/26/ Opening Statements 1, 8 (2018), https://nammco.no/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/03/nammco-26-opening-statements.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX2K-XA2K]. 
295 Letter from Hideki Moronuki to Robert Suydam, supra note 280. 
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Scientific Committee has been incomplete. For example, Japan did not 
explain how it incorporated bycatch and other mortality into its 
procedure for setting catch limits.296 
C. Submission of Data on Its Whaling Vessels
Japan must submit data, consistent with the ICRW Schedule, 
concerning the size (in gross tonnage) of each whaling vessel, as well 
as the number of days each vessel is at sea on the whaling grounds.297 
This information is needed to judge fishing effort, which can provide 
scientists with additional information by which to gauge the status of 
the stocks.298 As with other data, sharing these data is consistent with 
the decisions of the ICJ and ITLOS to exchange information299 and to 
ensure effective conservation and management over the species’ entire 
area of distribution or migration routes.300 
D. Use of the RMP as Approved by the IWC
As part of its duty to cooperate, Japan must use the RMP to generate 
catch quotas. The RMP, which the IWC has adopted but not 
incorporated into the Schedule as a binding regulation, is the IWC’s 
scientifically vetted process to estimate sustainable catch limits for 
commercial whaling of baleen whales,301 such as minke, sei, and 
Bryde’s whales. 
A requirement to use the RMP as part of the duty to cooperate is 
especially critical for at least two reasons. First, the RMP is designed 
to produce sustainable catch limits. UNCLOS, too, requires parties to 
base catch limits on the maximum sustainable yield and optimal 
utilization, concepts that assume a non-declining target population 
capable of supporting sustainable exploitation.302 The RMP is the 
296 Id. 
297 Schedule, supra note 1, ¶ 28. 
298 Eyolf Jul-Larsen et al., Management, Co-Management or No Management?: Major 
Dilemmas in Southern African Freshwater Fisheries, 426/2 FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 
§ 2.2.1 (2003), http://www.fao.org/3/y5056e/y5056e.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNB7-D6DV]
(“An understanding of fishing effort is fundamental for assessing and managing fish
stocks.”).
299 MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2001 ITLOS Rep. 95 (Dec. 
3), ¶ 110. 
300 SRFC Advisory Opinion, supra note 127, ¶ 214. 
301 The Revised Management Procedure—A Detailed Account, supra note 177. 
302 See, e.g., U.S. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., FISHERIES GLOSSARY 28 
(2006), https://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st4/documents/FishGlossary.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
SN7P-TYLJ] (defining MSY as “[t]he largest average catch or yield that can continuously 
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international community’s scientifically vetted method for calculating 
sustainable catches of baleen whales—the type of whales that Japan 
has proposed to hunt.303 The RMP was developed after years of review 
by many of the world’s leading whale biologists. Thus, using a different 
model would be antithetical to sustainable use, optimal utilization, and 
the very goals of both the ICRW and UNCLOS. Consequently, Japan 
must use the RMP as part of its duty to cooperate. 
Second, if Japan does not follow the rules for setting sustainable 
catch quotas, Japan risks diminishing the whale stocks shared with 
other states as well as the Bryde’s and sei whale stocks that are also 
found on the high seas. This would violate Japan’s duty not to cause 
harm to the resources of other states or of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction.304 This interpretation is consistent with Article 56 of 
UNCLOS, which provides that coastal states “shall have due regard to 
the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner 
compatible with the provisions of this Convention.”305 It is also 
consistent with rulings of the ICJ and international tribunals, which 
have concluded that the duty to cooperate imposes a duty to give “due 
regard to the rights of other States and the needs of conservation for the 
benefit of all.”306 
For these reasons, Japan must use the RMP as approved by the IWC, 
including the 0.72 tuning level chosen for the CLA. The CLA is the 
IWC’s procedure for determining “safe” catch limits.307 The 0.72 
tuning level is designed to stabilize populations for any baleen whale 
at 72% of carrying capacity, or pre-catch level.308 The IWC adopted 
this tuning level in 1991 after reviewing a range of tuning levels 
provided by the Scientific Committee because it allows the IWC to 
“balance between the conservation objectives and the catch objectives 
established by the Commission.”309 Only by implementing the RMP 
be taken from a stock under existing environmental conditions. For species with fluctuating 
recruitment, the maximum might be obtained by taking fewer fish in some years than in 
others. Also called: maximum equilibrium catch; maximum sustained yield; sustainable 
catch.”). 
303 Sei, Bryde’s, and minke whales are all baleen whales. See Whales – An Introduction, 
INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, https://iwc.int/lives [https://perma.cc/EKC7-5R87] (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
304 See supra Part III. 
305 UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 56(2). 
306 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 72; Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Reports 175, ¶ 64. 
307 The Revised Management Procedure—A Detailed Account, supra note 177. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. 
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with its agreed tuning level can Japan ensure that its measures are, in 
the words of ITLOS, “consistent and compatible” with those of the 
appropriate international organization.310 
Japan has communicated to IWC members that it calculated its catch 
limits with a tuning level of 0.6,311 far lower than the IWC’s tuning 
level. In addition, while Japan claims that its “application of the CLA 
was based on the best and latest scientific information, including stock 
structures and abundance estimates,”312 it has not involved the IWC 
Scientific Committee313 to set its catch limits, and scientists have 
reported that “it is not possible to reproduce their catch limit 
calculations without more information.”314 Consequently, Japan has 
violated this obligation. 
E. Preparation of a Transboundary EIA
Because of the potential transboundary impacts associated with 
catching shared whale stocks, Japan must prepare an EIA either as part 
of its duty to cooperate, as noted in the Land Reclamation Case,315 or 
as a freestanding duty, as in Pulp Mills.316 Even if Japan is allowed to 
determine the overall content of the EIA, it must “hav[e] regard to the 
nature and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely 
adverse impact on the environment as well as to the need to exercise 
due diligence in conducting such an assessment.”317 Consequently, it 
must be conducted prior to whaling318 and with prior consultation with 
potentially affected states and IWC members.319 As Japan does not 
310 SRFC Advisory Opinion, supra note 127, ¶ 207(iii). 
311 Letter from Hideki Moronuki to Robert Suydam, supra note 280. 
312 Id. 
313 At the most recent meeting of the IWC Scientific Committee, Japan stated that it 
“will duly provide SC with scientific information of the catch limits by July 2019.” 
Statement from Japan Regarding Japan’s Withdrawal from IWC, in REPORT OF THE 
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE, Annex U (2019), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/download. 
php?ref=9570&size=&ext=pdf&k=&alternative=4692&usage=-1&usagecomment= 
[https://perma.cc/8RHD-REPD]. Japan has not yet provided that information. 
314 E-mail from Justin Cooke, Cetacean Specialist Group, Int’l Union Conservation 
Nature, Species Survival Commission, to Chris Wold, Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark 
Law School (Sept. 11, 2019) (on file with author). 
315 See supra Section II.B. 
316 See supra Section II.C. 
317 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20), ¶ 205. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. ¶ 206; MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2001 ITLOS Rep. 
95 (Dec. 3), ¶ 89(1); Chagos Arbitration, Mauritius v. U.K., 2011-03 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015). 
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appear to have prepared a transboundary EIA, it has already violated 
this obligation. 
F. Monitoring the Impacts of Its Whaling Operations
Japan has an ongoing duty to monitor the impacts of its whaling 
activities as part of its duty to cooperate. As the ICJ declared in Pulp 
Mills, the preparation of an EIA did not end Uruguay’s obligations to 
assess the environmental impacts of its pulp mills. Instead, “once 
operations have started and, where necessary, throughout the life of the 
project, continuous monitoring of its effects on the environment shall 
be undertaken.”320 Similarly, ITLOS declared in the MOX Plant Case 
that Ireland and the United Kingdom were required to cooperate in 
order to “monitor risks or the effects of the operation of the MOX plant 
for the Irish Sea.”321 Consistent with these decisions and its duty to 
cooperate, Japan must continue to monitor the impacts of its whaling 
on the relevant whale stocks and provide information deriving from 
these monitoring activities to the IWC and Scientific Committee. 
G. Prohibition on Whaling Until Unresolved Issues Are Addressed
Japan has a duty to prohibit whaling until it can demonstrate that
such whaling is consistent with maximum sustainable yield and 
optimum utilization. At present, it cannot do so due to the large number 
of unresolved questions relating to the structure of the stocks, 
abundance levels for the stocks, and bycatch levels, among other 
things. Without this information, it cannot ensure with any degree of 
probability that its whaling will be consistent with the requirements for 
sustainability and optimum utilization under Articles 61, 62, and 64 of 
UNCLOS. As stated in the CLA, without recent abundance estimates, 
catch limits are set at zero.322 
Without this information, Japan risks harming stocks shared with 
other states. In doing so, Japan would not be giving due regard to the 
rights of these states and violate its duty to cooperate and its duty not 
to cause harm to the resources of other states and areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. As noted in Section IV.D above, the RMP, and the 
information required to use it, provides the internationally recognized 
and scientifically vetted method for calculating sustainable catch limits 
320 Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205. 
321 MOX Plant, 2001 ITLOS Rep. 95, ¶ 89(1). 
322 The Revised Management Procedure—A Detailed Account, supra note 177. 
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for baleen whales. However, once these issues are resolved, then the 
duty not to take whales likely no longer applies. 
V 
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS OF UNCLOS 
Although Japan has withdrawn its consent to the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ for disputes involving marine living resources,323 it has 
reaffirmed its commitment to dispute settlement under UNCLOS.324 
Consequently, other UNCLOS parties may use the binding and 
compulsory dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS325 to compel 
Japan to implement its duty to cooperate and those UNCLOS parties 
that are also IWC members may use those procedures to compel Japan 
to implement its duty to cooperate through the IWC. 
UNCLOS’s dispute settlement provisions first demand that parties 
settle their dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
UNCLOS by peaceful means.326 UNCLOS makes clear that parties to 
a dispute have freedom to choose the means of settlement of their 
preference,327 including binding dispute settlement.328 However, if the 
323 Declarations of Japan, supra note 63 (amending its declaration to preclude the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction in “any dispute arising out of, concerning, or relating to research on, or 
conservation, management or exploitation of, living resources of the sea”). 
324 In a press release, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote the following: 
On 6 October 2015, Japan made a new declaration, considering that, as Japan is a 
State Party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and 
continues to observe its obligations, it is more appropriate, as long as there is no 
special agreement, to apply dispute settlement procedure under the UNCLOS that 
establishes provisions regarding living resources of the sea as well as the involvement 
of experts from the scientific or technical perspective when an international dispute 
arises with respect to research on, or conservation, management or exploitation of, 
living resources of the sea. 
Press Release, Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (undated), https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/ 
000104046.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8SL-35GN]. 
325 Parties are allowed to choose among four options. UNCLOS, supra note 7, arts. 
279–99. This legal opinion does not describe the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
four approaches. It notes, however, that Japan, which has been a party to UNCLOS since 
1996, has not made a choice of forum declaration under UNCLOS. Therefore, Japan is 
deemed to have accepted arbitration under the provisions found in UNCLOS Annex VII. 
Presumably, Japan has chosen arbitration under Annex VII because it prefers to have 
maximum control over the procedure; under Annex VII, it will be able to choose one of the 
arbitrators and jointly choose with the other disputing parties three other arbitrators. Id. 
annex VII, art. 3. 
326 Id. art. 279. 
327 Id. art. 280. 
328 Id. art. 282 (providing that parties may agree to submit a dispute to any other 
applicable arrangement such as general, regional or bilateral international agreement). 
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procedures chosen by the parties have been unsuccessful in bringing a 
final negotiated settlement, the parties may return to UNCLOS’s basic 
procedures.329 Under those procedures, the disputing parties must first 
exchange views.330 They may then opt to settle the dispute by 
conciliation, although they are under no obligation to do so.331 If these 
procedures do not result in a satisfactory resolution to the dispute, then 
one of the disputing parties may initiate a dispute under UNCLOS’s 
compulsory procedures for binding decisions. 
The provisions for compulsory dispute settlement by binding 
decision are among the many unique features of UNCLOS. Although a 
party may choose one court or tribunal over another, it is not free to opt 
out of compulsory dispute settlement entirely.332 A party may escape 
the binding dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS only if the 
dispute falls under one of the exceptions or limitations provided by 
UNCLOS. UNCLOS provides two possibilities. First, UNCLOS 
allows a state to make a declaration limiting the jurisdiction of the 
courts and tribunals, but it allows such declarations only for a narrow 
set of disputes, none of which relate to the duty to cooperate.333 In any 
event, Japan did not make any declaration regarding dispute 
settlement.334 
Second, UNCLOS provides exceptions that a party may invoke in 
specific disputes.335 Prior to the tribunal’s decision in the Chagos 
arbitration, the traditional view held that Article 297(1) limited 
jurisdiction to the three enumerated circumstances included in that 
paragraph.336 In the Chagos arbitration, however, the tribunal read 
329 Id. art. 281. 
330 Id. art. 283. 
331 Id. art. 284. 
332 Id. art. 287. 
333 Id. art. 298. UNCLOS does allow States to make declarations to opt out of disputes 
concerning (1) maritime boundaries with neighboring States or those involving historic bays 
or titles, (2) military activities and certain kinds of law enforcement activities in the 
exclusive economic zone, and (3) the U.N. Security Council’s exercise of the functions 
assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations. Id. 
334 See Law of the Sea, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3& 
clang=_en [https://perma.cc/WD3C-NUWV] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
335 UNCLOS, supra note 7, arts. 297–98. 
336 For an excellent discussion of the tribunal’s decision, as well as the negotiating 
history of Article 297, see Stephen Allen, Article 297 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea and the Scope of Mandatory Jurisdiction, 48 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 
313 (2017); see also Bernard H. Oxman, Courts and Tribunals: The ICJ, ITLOS, and 
Arbitral Tribunals, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 394, 404 (Donald 
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Article 297(1) of UNCLOS as allowing resort to dispute settlement 
concerning the “interpretation or application of [UNCLOS] with 
regard to the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or 
jurisdiction.”337 In other words, the tribunal instead concluded that 
Article 297(1) reaffirmed that those three cases were subject to 
compulsory dispute settlement.338 According to the tribunal, the 
inclusion of specific exceptions in Article 297(3) relating to certain 
fisheries disputes would be entirely redundant if Article 297(1) already 
precluded jurisdiction over those disputes.339 
Article 297(3) expressly provides for compulsory dispute settlement 
“with regard to fisheries,” although it also allows coastal states to avoid 
dispute settlement in certain circumstances.340 Specifically, a coastal 
state “shall not be obliged to accept” dispute settlement for  
any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the 
living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their 
exercise, including its discretionary powers for determining 
R. Rothwell et al. eds., 2015) (stating that Article 297(1) “establishes the basic rule generally
limiting such challenges to the three situations enumerated in that paragraph”). Article
297(1) provides as follows:
1. Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention with
regard to the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction provided
for in this Convention shall be subject to the procedures provided for in section 2 in
the following cases:
(a) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of the
provisions of this Convention in regard to the freedoms and rights of navigation,
overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or in regard to other
internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in article 58;
(b) when it is alleged that a State in exercising the aforementioned freedoms,
rights or uses has acted in contravention of this Convention or of laws or
regulations adopted by the coastal State in conformity with this Convention and
other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention; or
(c) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of specified
international rules and standards for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment which are applicable to the coastal State and which have been
established by this Convention or through a competent international organization
or diplomatic conference in accordance with this Convention.
UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 297(1). 
337 Chagos Arbitration, Mauritius v. U.K., 2011-03 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), ¶¶ 307–17. 
338 Id. ¶ 308. 
339 Id. 
340 The provisions read in relevant part, “Disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of the provisions of this Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in 
accordance with section 2 [concerning compulsory dispute settlement], except that any 
dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living resources . . .” UNCLOS, 
supra note 7, art. 297(3)(a). 
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the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of 
surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions 
established in its conservation and management laws and 
regulations.341 
While Japan may argue that a dispute over its duty to cooperate is 
really a dispute over its exercise of sovereign rights in the exclusive 
economic zone, that argument should fail. First, a commercial whaling 
operation does not relate to “fisheries,” and consequently, the exception 
of Article 297(3) does not apply. While the definition of “fish” and 
“fishing” often relates to non-fish taxonomic groups, such as 
crustaceans and mollusks,342 the laws of most countries conserve and 
manage marine mammals, such as whales and dolphins, very 
differently.343 UNCLOS, too, distinguishes fish from marine mammals, 
specifically allowing a different management regime for marine 
mammals than for other living marine resources.344 
Second, although the exception in Article 297(3) refers to “living 
resources,” that exception must be read consistently with the general 
rule that precedes it.345 In this case, the general rule provides that 
“fisheries” disputes are subject to compulsory dispute settlement. The 
exception cannot be read more broadly than the rule. 
Third, properly presented, a case against Japan would not 
necessarily be about its right to whale or even the number of whales it 
is taking. Instead, it would be about its duty to cooperate by sharing 
data, following the RMP, and fulfilling the other obligations discussed 
in Part IV. Even if Japan has certain rights and implementation of those 
rights is exempt from compulsory jurisdiction, it also has duties, and 
those duties are not exempt from compulsory jurisdiction.346 The 
tribunal in the Chagos arbitration concluded that Article 297(3) also 
341 Id. 
342 See, e.g., Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 
16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(12) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91) (defining “fish” as “finfish, 
mollusks, crustaceans, and all other forms of marine animal and plant life other than marine 
mammals, and birds”) (emphasis added). 
343 See, e.g., U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361–1421h 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91) (prohibiting the taking, import, and export of marine 
mammals, subject to narrow exceptions). 
344 See supra Section II.A (describing Article 65 of UNCLOS). 
345 UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 297(3)(a). 
346 The plain language of Article 297(3)(a) speaks only to exempting disputes involving 
the exercise of sovereign rights. Nowhere does it exempt a coastal State from implementing 
its duties or exempting disputes concerning duties from compulsory dispute settlement. 
See id. 
140 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 35, 87 
exempted procedural obligations, such as the duties to consult,347 but 
the duty to cooperate is substantive and includes, in the context of 
Japanese whaling, the requirement to use the RMP and the duty to 
prohibit whaling until relevant data are collected. 
For these reasons, a dispute involving Japan’s duty to cooperate for 
the conservation and management of whales is subject to the 
compulsory dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. 
CONCLUSION 
Japan may withdraw from the ICRW and IWC, but customary 
international law and UNCLOS impose significant obligations, 
including the duty to cooperate and the duty to prepare a transboundary 
EIA, that Japan must fulfill prior to whaling. Moreover, the specific 
elements of the duty to cooperate—consultation, notification, 
information sharing, and monitoring, for example—are ongoing duties 
that Japan owes to IWC members. 
The decisions of the ICJ, ITLOS, and other international tribunals 
make clear that states must give “due regard” to the rights of other 
states. In the context of Japan’s commercial whaling, Japan must give 
“due regard” to the rights of other states by cooperating through the 
IWC. These decisions also make clear that the duty to cooperate 
depends on the nature of the rights held by other states. 
This Article has detailed the relevant law and the nature of the rights 
held by IWC members and reaches the following conclusions: 
1. Although Japan has withdrawn from the ICRW and IWC, it has
a duty to cooperate through the IWC in the conservation,
management, and study of cetaceans. The duty to cooperate is
customary international law that finds a specific expression in
UNCLOS Articles 65 (for marine mammals in exclusive
economic zones) and 120 (for marine mammals in the high seas).
2. NAMMCO and the ATS do not constitute “appropriate
international organizations” for purposes of Japan’s commercial
whaling. NAMMCO only applies to activities in the North
Atlantic and would not apply to any of Japan’s past whaling
activities or to its current whaling activities. Moreover, a
regional organization like NAMMCO with just two participating
states and two overseas territories is not an “appropriate
international organization.” The ATS, including CCAMLR,
does not constitute an “appropriate international organization”
because the ATS and CCAMLR (1) apply only to areas of the
Southern Ocean where Japan no longer hunts whales and
347 Chagos Arbitration, Mauritius v. U.K., 2011-03 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), ¶¶ 299–300. 
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(2) allow hunting of marine mammals only for scientific and
other non-commercial purposes. CMS is not an organization
and, in any event, appears to defer to the IWC as the appropriate
international organization for the conservation and management
of cetaceans.
3. Even if Japan creates its own regional body, similar to
NAMMCO, participation in that organization would not
eliminate Japan’s duty to cooperate through the IWC. The plain
language of Article 65 provides that coastal states must
cooperate through all appropriate international organizations.
The drafters of UNCLOS also appear to have contemplated that
an organization other than the IWC would be appropriate under
Article 65 only with respect to bycatch of marine mammals in
fisheries. Regardless, the IWC is the only organization that
conserves and manages whale stocks on a global basis and for
all types of whaling. Thus, Japan is required to cooperate with
the IWC regardless of its creation of a regional management
body.
4. Decisions of the ICJ, ITLOS, and other tribunals make clear that
the duty to cooperate under both customary international law and
UNCLOS applies anywhere Japan might whale: the Southern
Ocean, North Pacific, or its territorial seas and exclusive
economic zone. Articles 65 and 120 of UNCLOS clarify that,
with respect to whaling in its exclusive economic zone and on
the high seas, Japan has a duty to cooperate through the IWC.
5. Decisions of the ICJ, ITLOS, and other tribunals interpret the
duty to cooperate, whether as customary international law or
under UNCLOS, to require that the relevant state have “due
regard” to and “take full account” of the rights of other states and
the needs of conservation for the benefit of all. This requires, at
a minimum, that the relevant state negotiate, consult, and share
information in good faith.
6. To fulfill its duty to cooperate with the IWC, Japan must
undertake the following actions:
a. Participate in IWC meetings. Japan must participate in
good faith in meetings of the IWC and its Scientific
Committee as a non-party observer.
b. Exchange information. Japan must provide data
concerning the number of whales killed, the number of
whales struck and lost, the number of each species that
are killed and struck and lost, and mortality from
bycatch and other anthropogenic causes. This duty to
exchange information also requires Japan to submit
information concerning the number and type of whaling
vessels involved in the whaling operation, including the
number of days at sea on the whaling grounds. This will
help IWC scientists confirm the population status of the
relevant stocks. Only by providing all of this data can
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the IWC ensure that its conservation and management 
measures are effective over the entire area of 
distribution of the relevant species. 
c. Use the Revised Management Procedure (RMP). Japan
must generate catch limits using the IWC’s Revised
Management Procedure in order to ensure that any
whaling is sustainable and takes into account the full
range of the stock.
d. Monitor the impacts of its whaling program. Japan has
an ongoing duty to monitor the impacts of its whaling
activities and submit any new information to the IWC.
e. Comply with the moratorium. Japan must comply with
the moratorium on commercial whaling until all
unresolved issues concerning the stocks are addressed.
As noted in Part III, significant questions remain about
the stock structure of both sei and minke whales, and
sei and Bryde’s whales are easily misidentified.
Moreover, data gaps must be filled such that the RMP
can generate catch limits that take into account all
mortality from all sources, including bycatch in
fisheries. Once these issues are resolved and data
submitted, however, Japan likely no longer has a duty
to comply with the moratorium.
7. As part of its duty to cooperate or as a freestanding duty to avoid
transboundary environmental harm, Japan must prepare a
transboundary EIA prior to engaging in commercial whaling
because its commercial whaling has the potential to harm
resources shared with other states or existing in areas beyond
national jurisdiction. In preparing the EIA, Japan must provide
relevant information to potentially affected states and allow
them to comment on the EIA.
8. The nature of Japan’s duty to cooperate with the IWC does not
change if its whaling is viewed through the lens of UNCLOS
Article 65 for cetaceans or Article 64 for highly migratory
species, which expressly refers to the promotion of optimum
utilization, because the duty to cooperate must be viewed in light
of the rights of other states. Rights relating to whales derive from
the conservation and management of whales through the IWC
and by virtue of the shared nature of whale stocks with other
states and the efforts of the IWC to conserve and manage whale
stocks. In any event, the IWC, through the RMP and other
measures, has been ensuring the sustainable use and optimum
utilization of whales.
9. If Japan does not implement its duty to cooperate, IWC members
that are also UNCLOS parties may use the compulsory and
binding dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS to compel
Japan to fulfill its duty to cooperate and duty to prepare a
transboundary EIA. Japan has resumed commercial whaling
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without fulfilling certain aspects of its duty to cooperate. For 
example, it has resumed whaling without seeking the advice of 
the IWC’s Scientific Committee and without using the IWC’s 
scientifically vetted algorithm for setting sustainable catch 
limits.348 It has resumed whaling without a scientifically 
accepted understanding of the stock structure for sei whales and 
minke whales. It appears to have resumed whaling without 
preparing a transboundary EIA.349 As such, Japan has violated 
its duty to cooperate, and UNCLOS parties that are also IWC 
members can challenge Japan’s whaling through the compulsory 
dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. 
348 See supra Section IV.D. 
349 See supra Section IV.E. 
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